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ABSTRACT OF THESIS- "BUILDING DESIGN FbR CRIME PREVENTION" 
N.R.Goodwin, June 1994 
Crime prevention through building is not a new concept, but awareness 
of it has increased following the rising incidence of crime. This 
thesis is based on research conducted during the last two years, and 
• from information and knowledge gained by the author from forty years 
of architectural practice. 
The research began with a review of published material which mainly 
concentrated on social influences and "target hardening" methods but 
did not address the fundamental interface between building form and 
susceptibility to criminal attack. In parallel, interviews were 
conducted with a structured sample of people specially selected for 
~heir experience of crime against buildings; building owners, police 
officers, security experts, architects, researchers, insurers, 
victims of crime and inner city residents. A case study, made wit·h 
the co-operation of Nottingham University and the West Midlands 
Police Authority, was based on an inner housing estate in Nottingham. 
This was part of an initiative aimed at introducing police 
architectu~al liaison officers to the design process so that their 
communication with arGhitects might be more productive. This study 
enabled informal interviews with twenty residents to be conducted. 
From the research the author has concluded that there is a strong 
conviction among experts that the potential for crime against 
buildings can be reduced at design stage, although this clearly 
cannot be conclusively proved. 
It was also clear that architects, though generally in agreement, do 
not always consider security at early design stage, and that many of 
their clients do not require them to do so. Crime Prevention Officers 
have much to offer the architect, but are conscious of a lack of 
professional status. The author is convinced that recommendations 
on security need to be codified into regulations enforce~ble by law. 
"An Architect, armed with some understanding of the structure of 
criminal encounter, can simply avoid creating the space which 
supports it." 
Oscar Newman 
.. 
CHAPTER l 
INTRODUCTION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
L 1 The Author 
Rex Goodwin is a chartered architect with forty years experience 
in industry, local government and private practice~ Whilst 
having specialized more recently in the health and educational 
building sectors,. his experience embraces all building types for 
public# private and corporate clients. 
He has worked abroad and was responsible for the gold medal 
winning British Government entry into the 20th Triennale di 
Milano, and for consultancy advice in connection with schools in 
Northern Italy and Germany. 
As a member of the Council of the Leiceste'rshire and Rlitland 
Society of Architects, pe was able to gauge the opinions of his 
professional co.ileagues on a wide range of matte.rs including the 
subject of this dissertation. 
He retired from full time· practice in 1992. 
l. 
1.2 Objective of the Study 
Crime prevention is a term which can encompass any activity which 
is designed ·.:.a frustrate· those events defined as crimes by 
criminal law, or to reduce their frequency and rate of success. 
Within the overall concept of crime prevention would be included 
the work of the police, the courts, the prison and probation 
services, some kinds of social work, together with physical 
deterrents such as locks, bolts, alarms and other security 
devices. 
Whilst this thesis has been concerned with a range of crime 
prevention issues. its principal aim is to examine the range of 
"pre-emptive'~ m~asures which avoid the need to invoke the law, 
and the extent to which such measures are being included in 
buildings at ·the earliest possible-stage of design by architects 
who have been instructed in current crime prevention techniques. 
In addition, security design recommendations have been included. 
This has involved the study of the correlation between·crime and 
the physical configuration of buildings or groups of buildings; 
and the extent to which this aspect of crime prevention is 
currently being practised. 
The role of the police architectural liaison service, which 
offers advice to architects by experienced officers is crucial to 
the concept, and much emphasis is now given to the principle of 
"situational" crime prevention. This approach recognises the 
importance to the potential criminal of "opportunity" (i.e. 
low-risk detection, simple entry and ample reward), and seeks to 
persuade architects, at early design stage, to be fully aware of 
the need to avoid "building in" such opportunity~ 
The situational approach to designing out crime will be described 
in later chapters together with check lists of action needed by 
designers dealing with the more common functional types of 
building at initial sketch planning stage. 
2. 
In conducting this research, the author has drawn much 
information from his own personal experience as an architect in 
practice both in terms of the projects for which he was 
personallY ·responsible, but also from close ,involvement·with 
schemes designed by professional colleagues. 
Many of the conclusions drawn, therefore, derive from this 
source. The author's personal experience of planning and 
designing all forms of building have led to an accumulation of 
knowledge of the whole design process in all of its many forms. 
Indeed, part of the motivation for conducting this research was 
to modify and publish this personal knowledge. 
The flow diagram illustrates the sequence of activities based 
upon which the research was conducted. 
3. 
1.3 Need for the Research 
1.3.1 Current statistics 
Home OffiCe statistics (29) reveal that recorded crime in England 
and Wales has increased by an average of 5% per annum since 1980, 
and in 1990 it rose by an unprecendented 17%. Figures for 
subsequent years are expected to show an increasing trend. 
94% of these crimes were against property - which includes motor 
cars - and burglaries accounted for 22.1% of recorded crime. 
In the last ten years burglary of non-residential buildings has 
increased by an average of 4% per year, but in 1990 it increased 
by 23% from 1989, representing 11.6% of all recorded crime. 
Although it is generally acknowledged that the above figures for 
recorded crimes reflect the increase in the number of crimes 
being reported due to insurance claims ·(Home Secretary, BBCl 7 
March 1993) it is clear that crime against property is currently 
increasing. 
1.3.2 Fear of Crime 
In addition to the economic cost of burglaries and break-ins, 
the effect of such events on the lives of the victims is often 
traumatic. To many people, the threat of crime is as 
intimidating as crime itself. The elderly, the very young, and 
the handicapped are more vulnerable and suffer disproportionately 
from crime and the fear of crime. Any measures that can 
effectively improve their quality of life by the removal or 
elimination of such fear can do nothing but good. 
1.3.3 Present Initiatives 
The Construction Industry Research and Information Association, 
recognised the fragmented and unco-ordinated approach'· to. crime 
prevention, and the general lack of design guidance and has, with 
the financial support of the Property Services Agency, 
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commissioned a research programm~ aimed at producing design 
guidelines for the building industry and associated professionals 
for use when designing non-residential buildings. 
The first phase of the programme was completed in June 1993, and 
comprises a review of existing design guidance literature and the 
identification of security problems related to different building 
types. 
The literature review revealed that existing design guidance is 
focussed on target hardening measures with specific reference to 
security devices, locks and methods of access control. 
Very little information on design strategies for the building as 
a whole was identified, and the final guidance document to be 
published by CIRIA will address these broader and potentially 
more far reaching aspects of crime prevention by design. 
At the time of completing phase one of the CIRIA programme, the 
Association held a workshop in an attempt to obtain feedback from 
practi$ing architects on their experience of security issues and 
use of existing guidance. The workshop demonstrated that at 
present secu"rity i:.s not regarded a.s a key criterion at design 
stage, and is frequently not considered at all until after 
strategic design decisions have been made. Little use is made of 
such guidance as is available, with architects preferring to rely 
on their past experience, knowledge and imagination. This 
attitude is confirmed by the results of interviewsconducted by 
the author when researching this study. 
Other recent initiatives include the "Secured by Design" 
campaign, sponsored by the Home Office and police authorities, 
whereby awards are given to the developments which specifically 
incorporate crime-prevention measures recommended by the Police. 
(See Chapter 5.2) 
1.3.4 Insurance 
The insurance industry, worried by the rapid increase in claims, 
is beginning to take an interest in crime prevention at design 
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stage whereby the level of insurance cover, or cost of premiums, 
will be assessed on the basis of the perceived vulnerability of 
the building to criminal attack.(30) In other words, discounted 
premiums are offered to those building owners who have installed 
security devices. 
1.3.5 Need for legislation 
In the author's experience the design process is interactive and 
involves the balancing of conflicting elements in order to 
achieve a result which best satisfies the clients needs. The 
hierarchy of priorities which emerges from a thorough analysis of 
those needs is based often on the architect's subjective 
conclusions in the absence of specific guidance from the Client. 
The importance that is given to each specific "need .. , and its 
consequent position in the league table of priorities is 
sometimes ill-considered and arbitrary, depending on either the 
emphasis given to it by the client or the need to satisfy 
statutory regulations. Those items which are subject to 
statutory control and inspection, e.g. planning, building 
regulations and health and safety matters are given greater 
weighting, whilst those which are only "advisory" such as crime 
prevention measures appear near the bottom of the list of 
priorities if they are included at all. 
In the opinion of the author, therefore, the techniques of crime 
prevention, as applied to building design, layout and 
construction, require regulation and enforcement by statute. 
This could be achieved by the inclusion of a section on crime 
prevention within the Building Regulations so that all 
construction projects are vetted by local authorities, advised by 
crime prevention officers to ensure their compliance with 
published standards. 
1.3.6 Distribution of problem 
The crime statistics appended to this thesis (Appendix 1) have 
been supplied by the West Sussex Police. They are of interest to 
the extent that in addition to supporting the evidence of an 
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increase in annual recorded crime, the rising incidence of crime 
is not confined to the metropolitan urban areas, but is now a 
significant problem in the more rural districts of a relatively 
prosperous region. 
1.3.7 Burglary 
Burglary is a common crime since the burglar perceives private 
homes as soft targets, and that, as a general rule he knows that 
most houses will have those items which are attractive to 
thieves, i.e. televisions, video recorders, hi-fi sets, and in 
many cases, cash.or valuable items of jewellery or watches. Some 
householders may attempt to hide valuables but the experienced 
criminal has an ·ability to unearth 'hidden' treasures. 
According to the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit, more.than l 
in 30 households is burgled each year, though mostly by 
opportunists and very few involve physical violence. 70% ·of 
burglars enter domestic property through a rear window or door, 
and the period between lunch time and early. evening is the 
favoured time for attack. Occupants rarely confront the intruder 
and the-shock of the aftermath of a burglary, i.e. personal 
belongings scattered about the floor is usually the first 
·. intimation that the property has been burgled. 
1.3.8 Public awareness 
In spite of attempts by the Home Office and individual police 
authorities to educate the general public in basic crime 
prevention techniques, interviews conducted during this study 
tend to indicate that burglaries are perceived to be unfortunate 
events that affect "other people", and, generally speaking, few 
householders make any real attempt to improve the security of 
their property. Such efforts as are being made in this direction 
are mainly restricted to upgrading locks on the front and rear 
doors without concern for the strength of the door itself. A 
crime prevention officer who was involved in the semi~ar .(Chapter 
6) felt that most residential properties have doors which can 
easily be smashed, or which allow entry to be gained by removal 
of a glazed panel. 
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According to another officer at the seminar, even those 
householders who have been burgled are not easily persuaded to 
replace undamaged doors with stronger ones. 
There appears from discussions with police crime prevention 
officers, to be scope to address these problems at design or 
construction stage in new residential property, and it is in this 
field where the greater improvements in household security are 
possible. 
1.3.9 Social Factors 
The author is aware that much effort has been and is being spent 
by researchers,- criminologists, sociologists and others in order 
to find social or psychological explanations for the 
predisposition of some individuals habitually to offend. The 
experts appear to divide into two groups. The first comprises 
those who feel that those who offend do so for genetic reasons, 
i.e. they are born with criminal tendencies and need constantly 
to struggle against this instinct. 
The second group is convinced that criminals are created by 
society an~ are freed into a life of crime by environmental 
influences and social deprivation of various kinds. 
This study does not attempt to rationalise the desire or need to 
carry out acts of burglary or vandalism but simply accepts them 
as a fact of life and a problem to be dealt with pragmatically. 
In this context pragmatism involves the study of methods of 
protecting buildings and contents from criminal attack. 
8. 
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1.4 Definitions 
-1.4 .1 Crime 
' The Home Office Crime Prevention Document "Preventative Policing" defines 
crime as "any unlawful or anti-social act or acts which give rise to 
public anxiety and which interfere with the quality of life and citizensn. 
The OED defines crime as "a grave offence punishable by law; serious 
wrongdoing; sin; a very foolish deed". 
l. 4. 2 CPTED 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design is the creation, through 
design of a physical environment conducive to the overall security of the 
community. It is achieved through the establishment of a hierachy of 
spaces from public through to private so that the citizen 1 s area .of 
territorial concern is clearly defined and can be supervisee .. The 
potential for community interaction and communal surveillance is 
increased. 
1.4.3 Defensible Space 
The combination of :~eal or symbolic barriers, defined areas of influence 
and improve opportunities for surveillance which, together, bring an 
environment under. the control of its residents. 
1.4.4 Target Hardening 
The practice of increasing the physical security of targets of theft 
through the use of locks, bolts, grilles, reinforced materials, 
immobilising devices and alarms. 
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1.4.5 Displacement 
One of the effects of successful ''target hardening" is to turn the 
attention Ot thf! criminal to less protect.ed targets, to employ a different 
"method 11 of committing crime, or to turn instead to some completely 
different form of illegal activity~ This phenomenon is known as 
displacement. 
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1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The following synopsis of chapters is intended as a guide to the thesis 
as a whole and is complementary to the flow diagram at the end of this 
section. 
Chapter 1 comprises a brief biographical note on the author and his 
qualifications for undertaking architectural research; defines the 
objective and emphasises the need for the research; explains the 
meaning of terms and abbreviations commonly used within the field of 
crime prevention; shows graphically the process followed by the author 
in producing the thesis. 
Chapter 2 sets out the methods employed by the author in collecting the 
data necessary to achieve the objectives stated in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 3 is a review of current literature on the subject in the form 
of books, design guides,. manufacturers catalogues, pub.lished articles 
and research studies. 
Chapter 4 comprises details of information obtained from interviews with 
a broad range of individuals and groups who are, or have been, exposed 
to the·results of burglary, either as victim, potential victim, or 
professional~ oper~ting in the field of crime prevention. 
Chapter 5 is a review of initiatives, and their objectives, currently 
being pursued by various agencies in an attempt to gain the support of 
the general public in their combined efforts to stem the rise in crime. 
Chapter 6 describes the joint efforts being made by Nottingham 
University and the Home Office Crime Prevention Units to relate 
theoretical principles of crime prevention to an inner city residential 
estate. 
Chapter 7 containsadvice to designers and architects when considering 
the impact of crime prevention measures on their schemes and stresses 
the importance of obtaining security advice at the earliest possible 
stage. 
ll. 
Chapter 8 sets out the conclusion reached by the author as a result of 
having conducted this study, and emphasises the need for further 
co-ordinated research leading to statutory control of crime prevention 
measures.' 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Introduction 
As stated in Chapter 1 the principal objectives which this project aims to 
achieve are two-fold. The first is to study whether and to what extent 
buildings can be made inherently more secure by measures incorporated at 
·design stage. The second objective is to attempt to establish whether 
architects and designers are aware of, and following, the advice and 
guidance currently available to them in this regard. In addition, as a 
means of gauging the general attitude towards this subject by the general 
public, who are the 'originators' of building projects, various 
non-professionals were interviewed, i.e. building owners, householders and 
company executives. 
Discussions with experts within. the security industry, the police and insurers 
have identiffed factors which need to be taken·into account by building 
designers. These appear as appendices at the end of this report. 
2.2 Nature of Subject 
In determining a framework upon which a·system of information gathering, 
collating, recording, testing and describing can be constructed, it is· 
necessary to understand that "design", in many ways, is an abstract 
concept.~ There is no absol'\].te standard by which the success or 
effectiveness of the design of a building can be judged except to the 
extent that it achieves the stated basic functional requirements~ Several 
different designers working independently will produce several different 
solutions to an identical brief. Each solution will have its individual 
character, style and form and each will elicit from the observer a 
different emotional response. There are few subjects that engender more 
heated debate than architecture, and the debate is never conclusive. 
In almost every respect, all new buildings are also prototypes to the 
extent that they differ substantially from their predecessors. Such 
differences derive not only from the individual designer's aesthetic 
objectives, but also from site influences, client requirements, resources 
and the progress of technology 
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Objective comparison between different buildings is therefore not valid, 
and this proved to be a handicap when trying to verify the conc'lusions 
reached during this res~arch programme~ 
In view of this the author reached the conclusion that useful information 
may best be obtained by concentrating on questioning individuals who had a 
tangible connection with crime prevention, albeit in some cases a slightly 
tenuous one. In this way the data collected was based upon informed 
opinion and detailed knowledge of the subject, and, consequently more 
reliable. A trawl of opinion from the public at large was not felt to be 
worthwhile, and numerically large sampling·· was therefore rejected. 
2.3 Methods of obtaining information 
2.3.1 Questionnaire. Attempts were made during the early stages of :information 
gathering, to construct a questionnaire which would,.by reason of its· 
comprehensive nature, provide a vehicle for obtaining ·the 
information required from selected recipients whose views were perceived 
·~· as crucial to ·the success of this project. Following·_many attempts to 
make such a questionnaire· "all embracing" to the extent that the same 
documen~ could be sent out to a range of people whose knowledge, 
experience and interest in the subject varied widely, the principle was 
abandoned for the f6llowing reasons:-
a) From his experience as a recipient of many such documents from post-
graduate students, the author knows that the -accuracy of answers is 
inversely proportional to the length and complexity of the document 
"the boredom factor 11 • 
b) Questions regarding crime prevention techniques are sensitive and 
confidential and many people are 1 naturally, reluctant to divulge 
their tactics. 
c) It is often impossible to target the appropriate individual in a 
large organisation, i.e. the specific employee who is most 
knowledgeable on this particular subject. 
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d) Senior executives and profes~ionals cannot always find time to 
address a long questionnaire with the result that, if it is answered 
at all, the answers are given by an employee at a lower level, and 
their-accuracy and relevance may consequently be suspect .. 
e) The range of sources of information is too diverse for a 
questionnaire approach. 
2 .. 3.2 Structured Interviews 
These were considered following the decision to abandon questionnaires and 
a few such interviews were conducted on an experimental basis. It soon 
became clear that such a technique did not lend itself to obtaining 
information from disparate groups since the structure of the interview 
needed to be adapted to suit the standpoint of the interviewee. The 
relatively large number of groups and the relatively small sample numbers 
in each group ruled out this approach which, it is felt, might also 
inhibit the free flow· of discussion. 
2 .. 3.3 Informal discussions - the "long interview" 
It was eventually decided to conduct informal discussions with individuals 
whose exposure to Criminal activity was through personal experience, 
either as a professional involved with crime prevention or as a victim of 
crime and this proved to be reasonably successful. Some of the questions 
asked were common to more than one interest group, but the resulting 
discussions, often lengthy, produced much information. It is felt that 
the informality of a one to one encounter enabled interviewees to talk 
freely, without inhibition, which resulting in a more comprehensive trawl 
of opinion. McCracken (36) commends this technique as a most revealing 
form of obtaining information, particularly from specialists or other 
technically qualified participants. 
In this connection the author's wide experience and diverse range of 
contacts established during a long career in architectural practice were 
of major importance in gaining access to the top eche-lons of management. 
Such experience and knowledge also enabled discussions to be conducted in 
a mature, expert and productive way. 
15. 
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2.3.4 Sampling Range (See Appendix 8) 
In order to gain the broadest possible range of informed opinion, the 
following 'categories of individual were interviewed:-
i) managing directors of large manufacturing, distribution and 
retailing organisations. 
ii) security officer employed by one of the above companies. 
iii) managing director of a public transport undertaking. 
iv) criminologist. 
v) senior architects in local government. 
vi) senior partners in private architectural practice. 
vii) architect/senior lectur.er at a University with a special 
interest in crime prevention. 
viii)detectives from a regional crime squad. 
ix) senior police officer responsible for training "architectural 
liaison" crime prevention officers. 
x) architectural liaison crime prevention officers. 
xi) principal research officers at the Building Research Station with 
special responsibility for researching the interface between crime 
and building design. 
xii) victims of burglary. 
xiii)circuit judge. 
xiv) residents of the North Sherwood Street Estate, Nottingham 
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The subject under investigation is complex and interactive, and detailed 
knowledge of it is confined to relatively few people. Most of these are 
to be found within the police service, the architectural profession, the 
sec~rity industry generally and the criminal fraternity. 
Selection of individuals from whom to obtain opinions must therefore be 
carefully considered. The objective her~ was to invite selected 
professionals to talk freely and express their views on the relationship 
between building design and crime from their particular standpoint. 
As part of the case study described in Chapter 6, random interviews were 
conducted with residents of North Sherwood Street estate, some of whom had 
been burgled, and all of whom were affected by fear of crime. 
Each individual respondent has a different viewpoint so the .information 
gained from each has a part to play. in assessing the overall effectiveness 
of the concept of designing out crime. Although numerically limited the 
choice of the sample was conscious and deliberate since the subject is 
not one which can be proved by targetting large numbers of individuals who 
have no knowledge of the subject . 
.. 
In addition the author's own personal exposure to client attitudes toward 
crime prevention at~design stage and the general reluctance to take the 
subject seriously, has assisted in reaching the ~onclusions set out in 
Chapter 8. 
Consideration was given to attempting to obtain the views of one or more 
successful burglars whose experience of building securitY - or lack of it 
- could be said to be the most valid of all. This approach was not 
followed up for two reasons - the difficulty in gaining access to them and 
the fact that most of the known burglars are in prison and could not, 
therefore, be classed as successful. In any case there is as much variety 
in the aspirations, motives and operating methods among burglars as there 
is amongst any other peer group. The casual offender will react to 
.. opportunity cues" or other stimuli which are momentary and fleeting and 
he may experience these on a random and infrequent basis . .(4} 
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2.3.5 Objectives of discussion 
The purpose of the interviews was to obtain information regarding the 
extent to \Y'hich .. designing out crimE;" •,o~as thought -to be a valid principle, 
to establish how much was known about it among clients and architects, 
and, consequently, to what extent were the principles being followed, and, 
from the police, how effective are the principles in use. In addition, 
building owners were asked whether they considered any additional cost of 
crime prevention to be acceptable, and whether they could quantify any 
burglary losses sustained in financial terms. 
Academics were questioned about the inclusion of crime prevention in the 
schools of architecture as a core subject, and researchers were asked to 
talk about their. work in attempting to prove a correlation between the 
aesthetic and structural configuration. of buildings and their 
vulnerability to attack. Other categories of. interviewee were asked to 
talk freely about their personal experiences of the aftermath of burglary 
either as victim or investigator. 
2.4. The burden of proof 
During the process of conducting interviews with those agencies who are at 
the "cutting e"dge" ~f crime detection and prevention it soon became 
apparent that .a wide measure of support existed for the basic concept 
behind this study, i.e. that the designer of a building could increase the 
inherent security of that building at design stage. In order to enable 
him to do so, he would need information rega.rding the modus operandi of 
the typical burglar so far as this is influenced by the configuration or 
construction of the building. Such information is now available in the 
form of design guides produced by police authorities, insurance companies 
and such agencies as local authorities and statutory undertakings. 
None of the experts interviewed was able to provide proof, in absolute 
terms, of the effectiveness of the crime prevention measures generally, 
though all were personally convinced that a criminal would be deterred 
when faced with security measures which would take lon9er.to overcome and 
increase the time of risk of detection. 
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The Home Office Crime Prevention Centre could produce 'before and after' 
statistics which might indicate that implementation of their advice had 
been successful,. particularly in a "target hardening" context, but their 
Director said - "I can produce statistics which would appear to support my 
conviction that the concept of CPTED (see 1.4.2) works in that the figures 
show a reduced level of crime in developments where CPTED principles have 
been incorporated at planning stage. By any common sense interpretation 
of these figures one must draw the conclusion that the security measures 
have been successful, but it could be that the individuals responsible for 
previous burglaries in the area have moved elsewhere." 
In a report on the effectiveness of crime prevention on council estates 
{25) , the researchers say - "Notwithstanding the claims which are made 
about the success of particular crime prevention initiatives we can never 
say with complete certainty that they work." 
Following his research into the effectiveness of the "Secured by Design" 
(SBD) campaign, Pascoe (4) concluded that a direct comparison between a 
housing estate which had incorporated the SBD recommendations and one 
which had not was impossible since there were too many other variables, 
and thab it was not feasible to establish a control group. 
This study has reacheq the same conclusion. All new buildings are 
prototypes and all differ from each other to the extent that their 
occupants impose their own disparate personalities on their homes or 
places of work. Every household has different lifestyles, priorities, 
aspirations and resources,. and every individual has his own perception of 
his vulnerability to criminal attack. 
Harrington-Lynn (12), following a review of building design and security 
for the Building Research Establishment concludes that "the effectiveness 
of the current guidance on crime prevention for dwellings, although based 
on the best current practice and experience is largely unproven ... 
There is, therefore, no apparent method whereby the effectiveness of crime 
prevention measures can be conclusively and absolutely proved by 
experiment~ calculation, testing against controls, or clinical trials. 
The author, has sought continuous advice, throughout the research 
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programme, from those professionals who are selected by the Home Office to 
advise architects on crime prevention at project design stage. 
The Home Office recommendations set out in Appendix 2 have the support of 
trained crime prevention officers and form the basis of their guidance to 
project architects. They represent, in the form of design check lists, 
the latest views of the crime prevention specialists. 
The Case Study described in Chapter 6 aims to relate the application of 
the design guidance for crime prevention to a live example, and 
exemplifies the extent to which crime prevention techniques can be applied 
to existing buildings. It is possible. that. a 'before and after' study of 
statistics relating to incidence .of burglaries on the estate would be 
interesting, but. since the rate of change of occupants of the area is 
high, and·police records show that the majority of previous offenders had 
been.living on the same estate when burgling their neighbours, the figures 
could not be relied upon. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF PUBLISHED MATERIAL 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
3. 
'3.1 
REVIEW OF PUBLISHED MATERIAL 
Generally 
There is a great deal of published material on crime prevention in 
general in the form of books 1 magazine articles, research papers, 
videos, design guides and manufacturer's literature (see Bibliography}, 
together with British Standards Institution guidelines (17) and 
recommendations to building designers on specific aspects of security 
in buildings. 
Studies .of patterns of crime in specific locations at specific times 
are prolific, and the government agency responsible for crime 
prevention, the Home Office, initiates research programmes and 
publishes the iesults from time to time in the form of statistics, 
graphs and trends.. These studies a·re uSed as a basis for guidance on 
crime prevention techniques and recommendations issued to designers 
through the agency of local police authorities. The guidelines issued 
by the States of Jersey Crime Prevention panel (16) are particularly 
comprehensive. 
Each police authority records all examples of crime reported to it 
under headings oL type of offence, location and whether or .not a 
conviction or prosecution ensues_ 
The Building Research Establishment has conducted studies which more 
specifically address the interface between crime and buildings (12, 
13), but relatively few publications consider the more abstract aspects 
of designing out crime except where these coflcern the layout of housing 
estptes_ Most design guidance stresses the importance of "natural 
surveillance" whereby the configuration of housing layout enables 
individual properties to overlook one another, and the principle of 
limiting access points, but recommendations at a more specific level 
are generally confined to "target hardening" (5). 
At project level, i_e. the individual building on t~e drawing board, 
advice in written form is sr:arse, and this is almost certainly due to 
the infinite variety of building form. Different types of projects arc 
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subject to different levels of risk, and the configuration of the 
finished building is a compromise between many conflicting influences 
of which crime prevention is but one. It is not feasible, or sensible, 
to elevate the importance of designing for security to a level above 
itd perceived importance in the normal hierarchy of factors which 
influence the design of buildings, i.e. the "brief". In the case of 
banks or other high risk buildings, however, security would 
automatically have greater importance amongst the totality of 
requirements which make up the brief to the Architect. 
The brief, moreover, should be a continuously evolving document, 
modified from time to time as a result of client/architect discussion 
in an attempt to resolve conflicting requirements, e.g. security and 
ease of escape in the event of fire~ The resolution of these conflicts 
requires input from architect, client and specialist advisers if the 
most successful compromise is to be achieved. Design is a fluid 
process, able to change direction as necessary within the discipline of 
the basic concept. 
Design guides therefore tend to be general rather than specific and are 
likely to take the form of check lists rather than illustrations of 
preferred building shapes. (See Appendix 2) 
3.2 Influences on current policies 
The basis of current thinking on crime prevention in building 
design is the concept of 11 defensible space" as expounded by Newman (2) 
following studies carried out in the USA in the seventiesA Newman 
concluded that a strong correlation exists between the incidence of 
crime and the configuration of buildings, and, in particular, that 
crimes are more prevalent among communities who live in multi-storey 
apartment blocks. Whilst the statistics which support this conclusion 
cannot be disputed it is clear that a sociological dimension exists to 
the extent that the inhabitants of such areas are generally financially 
or racially disadvantaged and contain a high proportion of single 
parent families. Similarly, it has been shown by Heal and Laycock (8), 
that such estates contain larger numbers of children and young people, 
and that statistics which appear to relate crime incidence to building 
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form should take account of sampling differences and disproportionate 
ratios of an age-group which have been shown to be more likelY to 
offend anyway. 
Nevertheless the crime prevention agencies in the UK are convinced of 
the basic soundness of Newman's principles and Poyner (1) concludes 
that the basic premise of defensible space is still valid. 
The single most important shortcoming in Newman's thinking is that his 
philosophy can only apply to residential buildings. Commercial, 
industrial, leisure, retail, educational and other communal buildings 
are usually occupied only during working hours and are often surrounded 
by other similar purpose groups. The concept of mutual surveillance by 
neighbours.cannot apply on an industrial estate or a shopping. mall, 
but, to some ex~ent this can be achieved by electronic means with the 
increased use of surveillance cameras either on individual buildings or 
in shopping malls and town centres. 
The results. of Poyner's. research (1) tend to support the main thrust of 
Newman's conclusions but Poyner questions the concept· of 
"territoriality" to the extent that he perceives a .shift towards 
11 acces~ibility 11 and produces evidence to show that control of access to 
neighbourhoods can reduce crime. Similarly, Poyner believes that the 
limiting of accesi to the communal areas of apartment buildings and to 
the backs of houses has been shown to reduce burglary. 
Clarke and Mayhew (25) have gathered together studies initiated by the 
Home Office and, as a result, modified their interpretation of the 
11Situational 11 approach to crime prevention, which still forms the basis 
on t-Jhich crime prevention advice is given by the police. Like Newman, 
though, they have concentrated their attention upon residential 
buildings in general, and high rise council estates in London in 
particular. The situational measures set out by Clarke and Mayhew 
are:-
i) Target hardening 
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- e.g. use of stronger locks and 
security hardwar~ g~nerally. 
ii) Target removal 
- e.g. avoiding potential 'wage 
snatch' by paying employees by 
cheque. 
iii) ~emoving the means to crime - e.g. use of plastic glasses in 
iv) Reducing the pay-off 
V) Formal surveillance 
vi) Natural surveillance 
vii} Surveillance by·employees 
viii} Environmental management 
pubs, -.avoiding "glassing". 
e.g. marking valuable property in 
the hope that this would deter. 
- e.g. use of police or security 
personnel to guard property. 
- e.g. relying on the normal 
inquisitiveness of neighbours. 
- e.g. doormen, caretakers or the 
equivalent of the French 
"concierge". 
- e.g. separation of opposing 
spectators at football matches and 
crowd control measures. 
The above examples, although not all·specific to building design, 
represent an approach to crime prevention which is the basis of the 
police approach to the subject. This follows the philosophy that if 
the pr~-disposition of an individual to offend cannot be changed, then 
the "situational" approach aims to make it harder for him to do so .. 
Published material which specifically addresses the problem of criminal 
attacks on non-residential types of building, and which is based upon 
studies of the incidence of such attacks is sparse. Although those 
statistics which do. exist indicate a steady rise in such attacks, 
relatively little work has been done by researchers in this particular 
field. Recognising this, the Construction Industry Research and 
Information Association {CIRIA) has commissioned a research programme 
with the specific aim of producing design guidance for architects and 
builders engaged in the non-residential construction sector. At the 
time of writing only the first part of the results of this study has 
been published. 
Crewe (28) examines the whole subject of CPTEO in coOsiderable detail, 
ranging from the sociological factors which are thought by some 
criminologists to generate a desire to offend to practical examples of 
24. 
building design and layout which.he feels will deter all but the 
determined and persistent burglar. The emphasis, however, throughout 
the study is on the potential effectiveness of CPTED when applied 
correctly.- Crewe is not able to offer conclusive proof of this :3.nd 
admits that too many variables exist to make direct comparisons between 
buildings which have incorporated CPTED recommendations and those which 
have not. Nevertheless his is a very comprehensive and useful aid to 
an architect wishing to "build in" sensible security measures at 
planning conception stage. 
The value of surveillance by neighbours and passers by is examined by 
Shapland and Vagg (27) who conclude that there is a need to 
differentiate between 'neighbourhoods' and 'communities'., the former 
often represent.ing a convenient planning entity -only, with no great 
.sense.of belonging while the latter represents a coherent ·social group, 
interdependent and mutually supportive. Shapland and Vagg feel that 
natural· surveillance is more widespread in the 'community' group. the 
members of which, on the whole, are older and know each other better. 
Neighbourhoods may contain a more complex social mix, there is a 
greater rate of change of individuals and· families and fewer incentives 
or oppprtunities to develop a community ethos. To the·extent that 
natural surveillance is an inherent component of community life it is 
perceived by Shapland and Vagg to play·a useful role in crime 
prevention; Their findings support one of Newman's (2) fundamental 
principles, i.e. that criminals are, to a degree, deterred by the fear 
of being overlooked, and, since the 'community ethos' is conspicuously 
absent in high rise housing, that such developments are prone to more 
burglaries than ground level houses. 
Rosenbaum (6) reports an experiment in CPTED in Hartford Coun., Seattle 
and Portland (Oregon) in the late seventies where the concept was 
tested on both commercial and residential sites. In Hartford the 
narrowing of street entrances to a housing area and the creation of 
"symbolic" barriers (large flower planters) were employed in an attempt 
to reduce through traffic. These changes are fairly superficial but 
the researchers claimed to have evidence that the idea Qas worked to 
some extent. 
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The Portland experiment, involving a commercial area of that city, 
found that the single most effective measure was a significant 
upgrading of street lighting, followed by an increase in formal 
sucveillance by security services. It is interesting to note, at this 
stage, that the principle of deterrence by fear of being seen is still 
a major factor in crime prevention. 
The Home Office Crime Prevention Centre is responsible for selecting 
and training ~~architectural liaison officersH, usually police officers 
currently working in a crime prevention role, to advise architects, at 
design stage, on crime prevention measures which should be designed 
into their projects. Its Handbook (ll) is a comprehensive document 
which explains the p):"inciples of CPTED, advises 1\.LO' s on the correct 
way to deal with design professionals and includes design checklists 
for various building types (Chapter 7). Although textually useful, the 
document would benefit from more use of sketches and illus~rations 
along the lines of the design handbook produced by the States of Jersey 
Police (16) which is a model publication and an example which other 
police authorities would do well to follow. · Another Handbook produced 
by Collishaw and Severn (15) is useful but is principally concerned 
with target .hardening and is not in a format which. lends. itself to use 
as a work of reference. Similarly, Leicestershire County Council (18) has 
made a serious attempt to produce guidance for those involved in the 
layout and design of housing. It is a well laid out, comprehensive and 
detailed reference work, well-illustrated and easy to read. 
The Home Office from time to time issues handbooks (29) which are aimed 
at individual householders and small businesses and covers most types of 
criminal threat likely to be encountered in normal lif€. It is a 
comprehensive manual, well provided with photographs and illust~ations, 
and intended to be delivered to all households. Whether such efforts 
can overcome the resolute refusal of the average citizen to recognize 
that he or she is as much a potential victim as his or her neighbour 
remains to be seen. Suffice it to say that the author has found 
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considerable public apathy during his interviews. This attitude may be 
an obstacle to any government sponsored crime prevention initiative. 
The impetus for change must be local and ffcommunity 11 based, since in a 
study carried out in 1980 (1) to find out whether press, poster and TV 
advertising campaigns change the extent to which ca:r;-... dr,;ivers lock their 
cars parked in the street, it was found that such campaigns had no 
effect whatever on the security-consciousness of drivers. 
Coleman (3) claims to have established correlations between certain 
design features such as number of storeys, access points, overhead 
walkways and play areas and crime, and is highly critical of 
multi-storey apartments as a solution to housing needs. She recommends 
the building of no more such blocks, and large scale re-modelling of 
existing buildings to eliminate their 11 Worst design features 11 • A 
geographer by profession, she has now established the DICE Consultancy 
{Design Improvement Concern for the Environment) which offers advice to 
architects and others on designing· out crime. 
Not surprisingly, a work critical of architects (3) has generated 
considerable irritation among members of the architectural profession 
who responded by organising a conference on 11Rehurnanising Housing 11 in 
Febru~FY 1987. Papers were written and presented by invitation and were 
subsequently published in a book of the same title as the conference. 
Teymur, Markus and Wooley (42) and their contributors totally reject 
Coleman's theories and question the scientific basiS of her research 
methodology. They do not, however, offer any clear alternatives other 
than to recommend further research, and to the author their main aim 
appears to be to discredit the work of someone they perceive as 
••anti-architect- 11 
The security industry, perceiving sales opportunities, produce sales and 
technical literature in abundance, covering the whole range of security, 
including 'active' services such as patrols, guards, secure transport 
and dogs, and 'passive' measures from stronger locks to sophisticated 
electronic surveillance and access control systems. Architects are 
bombarded with catalogues and manuals, some technica1ly.comprehensive 
and useful, others blatantly sales orientated. Installers of burglar 
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alarms are proliferating,and each new entry to this lucrative field will 
target selected residential areas with leaflets describing introducing 
1 offers 1 • 
3 .. 3 Research,Programmes 
Much of the recent and current research into the subject of crime 
prevention through environmental design emanates from the Building 
Research Establishment or from research commissioned by them (12, 13 & 
14). The author of this thesis has been permitted to study the results 
of much of this work and finds that, in general content, it accords with 
much of the published material. The nature of the subject is such that 
the ERE will not permit reproduction of its research methodology or 
findings in any other publication.. Nevertheless it can be quoted as 
concluding that much more research is necessary to enable the 
information so produced to be codified in the form of either design 
gUides, manuals, recommendations or, preferably, statutory regulations. 
In the meantime Underwood and Shaw {13) report little current research 
activity in the United Kingdom. None is being undertaken at schools of 
architecture, though some academic institut~ons are constantly 
resea~ching the social and criminological aspects of the subject.. On a 
limited level, some authorities, local and health, Produce guidance 
notes for their oivn architects who are working "in-house" but none of 
these was made available to the author of this thesis. 
There is an apparent need, therefore, for a single, comprehensive manual 
which brings together the wealth of information now available in 
disparate form, to be produced and issued by H.M~ Government, possibly 
.initially as a consultative document preparatory to including within the 
Building Regulations. 
The most comprehensive recent studies are those carried out by 
Harrington-Lynn {12) on behalf of the Building Research Establishment-
He confirms the current practice of the adoption by Crime Prevention 
Officers of the "situational" approach to crime prevention in and around 
buildings. This policy assumes that the potential burglar is influenced 
by the layout and design of buildings and is afraid of being caught 
during the course of the crime. This philosophy is summarised by 
Harrington-Lynn as follows:-
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a) Deter 
b) Detect 
c) Delay 
d) Detain (if r>ossible) 
Harrington-Lynn concludes that crime prevention measures need the 
support of legislation and recommends the inclusion of such measures 
within the Building Regulations~ 
Most researchers agree that, if past trends continue, criminals will 
continue to diversify their activities and find new ways to overcome 
existing crime prevention techniques- It will be necessary, therefore, 
continuously to monitor developments in the modus operandi of burglars 
in order to devise appropriate counter measures and ensure the continued 
updating of any crime prevention measures, guidelines, police advice and 
any statutory regulations which may, in due course, be introduced. 
3-4 Conclusions 
Current published material can be broadly categorised as follows:-
a) Research findings 
b) Design guides 
c) "Target-hardening .. recommendations 
These works, though useful in their limited way, are far from 
comprehensive and do not address the basic principles of building design 
as a strategy. An architect, seeking guidance on the methods of 
increasing the inherent security of non-residential buildings at initial 
planning stage would not find the information he needs in a form helpful 
to him. The author is convinced that the necessary knowledge exists, 
but even those recommendations which are non-contentious, particularly 
for industrial and commercial buildings, need to be published as a 
comprehens.ive design guide with drawings and illustrations of good crime 
prevention practice. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSIONS WITH BUILDING OWNERS 
DESIGNERS, CRIME PREVENTION OFFICERS 
AND OTHERS 
Chapter 4 
Discussions with Building Ow:ters,- Designers, Crime Prevention 
Officers, ·Insurers and Others 
4.1 Selection of Interviewees 
In selecting the occupational categories of those interviewed, the 
principal objective was to obtain as wide a spectrum of opinion as 
possible from those who are affected by crime against buildings, those 
who seek to prevent it, those who investigate it and those who are 
involved with the design of new buildings and can thereby contribute 
to prevention of crime. It was felt that by casting the net as wide 
as possible and relying on an informal, unstructured interviewing 
technique, the information gained, though mostly subjective, would 
provide an accurate indication of whether crime can be reduced by 
attention to building design. In addition, the extent to which 
'designing out crime' is understood, or practised by construction. 
prof~ssionals c.an more easily be assessed in this way. It should, 
perhaps, be re-emphasised at this point that designing a building is a 
complex, interactive, intellectual process, involving the resolution 
of conflicting priorities, accommodation of inputs from many sources, 
thinking in three dimensions and constantly bearing in mind the 
disciplines of aes~hetics, time and cost. 
The representatives from industry (MOl - MD4) were chosen because 
their companies were responsible. for manufacturing, distribution and 
retailing. They faced the problems of burglaries in different 
building types and locations and were large enough to employ 
'in-house' design teams and security staff. The nature of the main 
product of one company was attractive to burglars, and dangerous if 
misused, and therefore subject to stringent regulation of storage 
security. 
The next group of interviewees can be said to have experienced various 
forms of crime, or the aftermath of it, on a more personal level, 
either as victims, investigators, academics teaching criminology, or, 
in one case, as a circuit judge sitting in a Crown Court·. 
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Scientists engaged in pure resear.ch into the crime/building interface 
work make up the third group. Their work is carried out on behalf of 
the Building Research Establishment, and they have direct li:JkS \-.lith 
the Home Office, Universities in the U.K. and overseas, the security 
industry and the British Standards Institution. Their computer 
database on the subject is very comprehensive and proved to be a 
useful source of material during this study. 
Finally, the building professionals were selected, architects and 
designers from private and public offices responsible for all types of 
building design, residential, commercial, industrial, retail, health, 
education and leisure. In addition, one architect with a specific 
interest in crime prevention who is currently teaching full time at 
university, and who organises instruction courses for crime prevention 
officers wishing to be appointed "Architectural Liaison Officers for 
their police authority". 
4.2 The Interviewing Format 
Although interviews were conducted informally, in order to obtain the 
desired.· information ·the Author evolved a list of 'core questions' 
which were put to all interviewees except the professionals, (see 
Appendix 3) and the residents of North Sherwood Street. (Chapter 6) 
Interviews conducted at North Sherwood Street (Chapter 6) were 
specific to their circumstances and the willingness ·(or otherwise) of 
the residents to·speak freely on this subject. 
The replies to the questions were not expected to be clear and concise 
and such proved to be the case. Although the interviewees are 
educated and articulate individuals, their lack of familiarity with 
the nature of the design process became apparent when discussing 
questions 5, 8 and 9. The author knows from personal experience that 
building users adapt easily to an existing building, but are less able 
to relate to hypothetical and abstract possibilities. 
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4.3 The Response 
(For Key to references see Appendix 8 
Because of.the varied opinions expres~ed by those interviewed, the 
information gained, though invaluable, cannot be translated into 
tabular or graphic form. Also, in an attempt to adhere to the original 
premise of this study, i.e. that consideration given to the form of 
the building at design stage can, in itself, increase its security, 
the use of "add-on" security systems such as electronic alarms was not 
discussed in detail. 
The information gained from interviews is set out in narrative form, 
reflecting the prpcess by which it was obtained. 
4.4 The Commercial Sector 
In the commerc·ial sector, the motives for crime against buildings·, 
so far as they can be identified,. involve theft of goods or money 
rather than vandalism for its own sake. According to the police 
officers interviewed (ALO 3 &·5) the modus operandi will be normally 
by entry through· a window or door at the rear of the premises,. or by a 
more direct approach using a vehicle to smash a display window or 
roller shutter to gain entry. In these cases of "ram raiding .. ,. 
according to the police,. the same vehicle is often used for carrying 
away the stolen goods. 
Two large commercial firms(MDl & MD2) were at pains to.point out that 
their major concern was to ensure adequate proteCtion to their main 
computer from either deliberate sabotage,. which would be a disaster 
for their business or from "hacking" or other esoteric forms of 
computer crime. This type of risk is comparable with that to which 
banks, building societies and post offices are prone, and special 
measures which, due to their secrecy, are outside the scope of this 
research, are employed to protect such installations. 
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It should be emphasised, at this stage, that the subject of security 
is highly sensitive, particularly in commercial and industrial 
applications, and interviewees from such organisations were naturally, 
somewhat gUarded and reticient in supplying information. Even so the 
general impression gained from many discussions with senior personnel 
was a distinct scepticism regarding the principle of reducing crime by 
building design~ The retailers in particular seemed to prefer to rely 
on "state of the art" electronic protection coupled with out of hours 
security surveillance by foot patrols or dogs. In the case of one 
large organisation comprising manufacturing, warehousing, distribution 
and retailing, the .. in-house" design teams received no briefing on 
security but on completio~ of new buildi~gs a team of security experts 
moved in and installed such electronic equipment as they felt 
necessary. The fact that this approach led to insecure and unsightly 
surface wiring appeared to be accepted by t~e management in spite of 
reservations expressed by the design teams(MDl). One director(MD2) 
advanced the view that the designers were employed simply to provide 
the maximum sales area for the minimum capital outlay, and that any 
attempt to build in security planning might jeopardise that principle 
and would not be acceptable to the company. He did not perceive his 
architects as professionals with a contribution to make in the field 
of crime prevention:- "Security matters are best left to the 
experts", was his opinion, the 'experts' in this context meaning the 
security industry. 
This "add-on" policy_towards security arises in part from the 
perception of their in-house design teams as support facilities who 
have no part to play in broad strategic planning. Architects and 
designers are unlikely to attain main board status in manufacturing 
organisations and have little opportunity to influence security 
policy. In addition, commercial and industrial firms in the author's 
experience tend to look toward the alarm systems manufacturers and 
installers for advice on security rather than to the design 
professions or even the police. Consequently, security policy tends 
to concentrate on "target hardening", using a myriad of sophisticated 
electronic devices, rather than looking at the problem'·from first 
principles, in conjunction with their de~igners and the police crime 
prevention service. 
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4.5 The Public Sector 
By contrast, the attitudes expressed by all of the senior architects 
in the public sector {LGAl - LGA4) appeared far more positive and 
" forward looking. In every case the responsibility for co-ordinating 
crime prevention measures in their department had been allocated to a 
senior professional who has a continuing dialogue with the local 
police. The crime prevention officers are called in to examine 
building proposals at sketch plan stage when recommendations can be 
more easily incorporated into the building layout.or siting without 
compromising the overall performance of the scene, or adding 
unnecessarily to its cost. In one case a standing 'risk committee' 
had ·been set up to meet on a frequent basis and discuss crime 
prevention at project level as necessary. 
Seminars and workshops are arranged. by the authorities on a regular 
basis to ensure that designers and archit~cts remain conversant with 
improvements in crime prevention.measures as criminals become ever 
more Sophisticated in their methods of attack. A greater 
understanding of the curre.nt methods of criminal attack leads to more 
success in pin-pointing and eliminating specific areas of 
vulneraBility in a building· whilst still at design stage. 
·. 
Many local authorities are now.producing design guides for use by 
their architects at planning stage. Such guides may be produced by 
the police·crirne prevention service, or by the design office staff 
based·on recommendations·and advice from the "architectural liaison 
officer" who is usually a policeman with specific training in reading 
architects drawings and in elementary building construction. 
In view of the rising incidence of crime against property, the minds 
of large property owners, such as local authorities, have been 
concentrated of late by the insurance industry. Ever conscious of 
increasing claims following break-ins, theft and arson, insurers are 
taking a greater interest in crime prevention, and, in particular, 
what steps are being taken by property owners to prote.ct their own 
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property. There is little doubt that the increasing levels of 
insurance premium will encourage building owners to give greater 
attention to crime prevention, and, in the absence of statutory 
legisl<'ttiort ·to perform a similar function, this form, of 
"encouragement" may well be effective. 
Two local authorities interviewed (LG2 & LGA4) were attempting to 
assess the nature and level of risk at all of their buildings and 
prepare a long term programme for the security upgrading of their 
existing building stock. Some examples of their school buildings are 
of lightweight construction with much glazing, flat roofs and of 
complicated plan shape with many concealed areas ideal for unobserved 
criminal activity. This applies particularly to schools built in the 
1960 - ·1980 period and such buildings are difficult to make 
significantly more secure without massive expenditure. Inevitably, 
since the building exist, the measures to be taken will fall within 
the "target hardening'.' category, but, by assessing the apparent 
weaknesses in the building, vital feed-back to design teams can take 
place so that similar "soft-spots" can be avoided on future projects. 
With less use·of "systern11 type construction much of the inherent 
insecurity can be avoided since 'traditional'· construction techniques 
are, by their very nature, more resistant to criminal attack. 
Brickwork and concrete are stronger than light cladding materials. 
The attitude of these local authorities towards crime prevention in 
their own buildings is encouraging and a similar level of 
enlightenment would not be inappropriate in the private sector. Large 
commercial organisation-s are less likely to be influenced by rising 
levels of insurance premium since, unlike public authorities, they can 
simply pass the additional cost on to their customers. 
The general feeling amongst all "in-house" architects interviewed was 
that crime prevention should be introduced into the curricula of 
schools of architecture as a subject equally important with fire 
prevention and energy conservation, and that companies should initiate 
training programmes for all personnel. 
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Until the large corporate trading and manufacturing organisations in 
the private sector adopt a similarly enlightened view on the 
co-·relation.between building design and crime, and allow their 
professiondl designers to become involved in policy making, 
opportunities for "designing out•• crime in factories, warehouses, 
shops and hotels will remain limited. It is also for the building 
professionals to ernphasisef at every opportunity, that if· they are 
encouraged to use their skills and training, buildings can be designed 
to counter the activities of all but the professional burglar at no 
significant additional cost, and without aesthetic cornp~omise. 
4.6 Private Architectural Practice 
In the field of private architectural practice,-the level-of ·attention 
given to crime prevention was not found to be as_ high in the public 
sector. The general level of awareness of ~rime prevention through 
envirorunental design varied enormously from practice to practice· and 
from individual to individuill in ·the same practice. 
Few firms had a conscious·policy of applying crime prevention 
techniq~es to all buildings, few understood the level of risk and none 
of the practices interviewed had developed or issued guidance to their 
staff for use at early planning stage. 
Some offices carried out design wOrk on a regular basis for local 
authorities or public authorities and those responsible for this type 
of work were considerably better informed. In these cases the design 
firms were responding to the requirements of their clients rather than 
initiating the policy themselves, with the consequent increase in 
their understanding of crime prevention. 
None of the practices interviewed (PAl-PA3) had considered the 
appointment of staff to promote the philosophy of crime prevention 
within the office and to co-ordinate its application to specific 
projects. 'l'he need to acquire knowledge of security techniques as 
part of continuing professional education did not appe~r to be a 
priority. few architects had attended seminars or courses on the 
subject, and none of these interviewed had any plans to do so. 
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Most practices were aware of the existence of crime prevention 
officers within the local constabulary, and some had made use of the 
advisory services offered by them on specific projects. Where such 
advice had been sought it was felt to have been informative and 
useful, but so long as it remains optional and advisory rather than 
compulsory, the benefits which could ensue may not be realised. Local 
authorities are now required to notify the Crime Prevention Officer. 
of planning applications received to enable the police to initiate a 
dialogue with the architects concerned. 
4.7 Results of Interviews 
On the whole the impression gained from the interviews was that 
a) Architects could perceive a correlation between crime, 
building design and construction, but lay clients were less 
convinced. 
b) Architects felt that the subject should be given a higher priority 
in design offices and become a core subject in schools of 
architecture. 
c) A general feeling amongst some architects was that the job, i.e. 
architecture, was sufficiently difficult and constrained by 
existing legislation and interference from statutory agencies, and 
that, whilst accepting the need for crime prevention 
regulations they hoped these would not be introduced in their 
professional lifetime. The author has some sympathy with this 
view, but felt that it was not put forward as a serious objection 
to the generally accepted view that designing out crime was both 
desirable and achieveable. 
d) Knowledge of crime prevention techniques was, in general, limited 
to "target hardening" measures, i.e. locks, lighting and 
intruder alarms. 
e) Clients, excluding public authorities, were not generally 
convinced that crime prevention measures in general were cost 
effective. None was able t.o quantify the cost to them of losses 
sustained as a result of burglary as opposed to pilfering and 
shoplifting, and seemed to regard such losses as an acceptable 
overhead. 
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f) Some retailers could not reconcile the idea of security shutters 
to protect their display windows. 
displaying goods "(MOl). 
"Display windows are for 
g) Planning authorities were often unhelpful to the extent that they 
... 
refused _to approve the use of grill~s and shutters to shop windows 
if they regarded the location as being within an "envirorunentally 
attractive area". 
4.7.1 Criminologist's View 
The Criminologist (C) interviewed confirmed the existence df a link 
between crime and building design, butf in the case of 1960's type 
housing estates, research tends to show that the method of managing 
the estates is a significant factor_too. He indicated that the 
results of surveys carried out in. some London Boroughs ·suggeS.ted that 
when physical alterations to apartment blocks gave the residents more 
control over entrances, or reduced the number of escape routes open to 
intruders, crime was reduced. Similarly, when rearrangement of 
internal spaces produced greater opportunities for surveillance by 
residents the fear of identification tended to deter potential 
burglars. 
Whilst the criminologist appeared to accept the fundamental principles 
of reducing crime b~ design, he was. quick to point out that such an 
approach may not always produce the intended result. It has been 
observed that a frequent result of target hardening is to divert the 
effort of the criminal toward what he may perceive as a softer target 
nearby, or to a more promising location. This effect is known as 
displacement. Alternatively, his frustration may lead him to commit a 
more violent form of crime, e.g. armed robbery 
He pointed out that examples of this phenomenon are on record whereby 
following the upgrading of security in public libraries by installing 
electronic checking-out of books. theft of books is made more 
difficult, resulting in their being vandalised by the frustrated 
thief. 
38. 
Although he supported the idea generally of planning out crime at 
design stage, the criminologist emphasised the complexity of the 
subject, and pointed out- th~~ many other factors within society need 
to be stud•ied alongside the cJ·imejbuilding interface if worthwhile 
progress in crime reduction is to be achieved. These include estate 
management techniques which give householders more involvement and 
control over their domestic environment and the means of·access to it. 
4.7.2 ~he Police 
As would be expe·cted, the various departments of police authorities 
which deal with crime and the prevention and detection of it expressed 
enthusiasm with the principles of designing out crime. Alth?ugh a 
minority of police forces (approx. 40% in England and Wales) 
contribute to· the. design phase of building projects, the concept is 
gaining ground but more work is needed to publicise and encourage 
wider adoption of the principles. ~he author feels that commercial 
and industrial firms are, oti. the whOle,. reluctant to call upon the 
skill a.nd experie~ce on the part of the police., that· their input was 
either being ignored; or worse still, not being asked for in the first 
place. 
The police representatives(ALOl-ALOS) were keen to re-emphasise the 
nature of the service they offer, which, briefly is as follows: 
a) To provide information on site selection by means of a crime 
profile for the area under consideration. 
b) To provide advice at briefing stage on all aspects of crime 
prevention, including any analysis of risk specific to the 
building type. 
c) To provide a security report based on a check of the architect's 
preliminary drawings. 
d) To advise on appropriate types of security hardware, alarms, 
fencing, . 
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4.7.3 Victims of Burglary (Vl-V4) 
This group.consisted of people whose homes had been broken into at 
some time •:~n the past, but who had, to a large extent, overcome the 
trauma which initially, and sometimes permanently, affects victims of 
burglary. Their views were therefore more detached than if the event 
had occurred recently, but it was clear that their lives had been 
changed by the experience and that "things will never be the same 
againff. Some householders were not insured when burgled, but did not 
feel that they were in any way to blame, preferring to transfer 
responsibility to "the authorities" for not affording them sufficient 
protection. Only 50% of those interviewed had made any substantial 
improvements to the security of their home in spite of patient 
persuasion by the crime prevention officers, and their attitude seemed 
to reflect the hope and belief that "lightning never strikes twice in 
the same place". There are many, however, who could testify to the 
fallibility of that premise. 
The overriding impression gained was· one of resignation or apathy. 
"If they want to get in they'll get in whatever we do" (V2), was a 
frequent comment. A feeling of resentment towards uthem" - the 
collective for the government, the police, architects, insurers, 
builders - who it ~as felt had somehow failed to protect them from 
criminal attack(V4}. Much needs to ·be done to convince the ordinary 
citizen that there are cost effective measures that he can use to 
improve the security of his home. 
4.8 Conclusions 
Though many of the interviewees consider building security a problem, 
relatively few of the designers consider security factors formally 
during the building design process, although they acknowledge the 
value of 'building in' such measures as are appropriate to the risk. 
The range of security design measures relevant to site layout; site 
perimeter; building envelope; building interior and·access control, 
is extensive but there is no info-rmation available to assess 
objectively their efficiency either singly or in combination. 
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Specifiers currently rely upon subjective views and professional 
opinions,based on past case experience. 
The auther is aware that only a small minority of schools of 
architecture conduct any formal teaching on security aspects of 
design. Those that do so, do so briefly. The police sometimes 
participate as visiting lecturers, but some feel that their resources 
may be better employed as participants in practical designs(AL03). 
Although nearly 70% of the individuals those interviewed expressed the 
attitude that more could be done on security design in future, almost 
a quarter thought this would not be worthwhile or cost effective. 
4.9 Recommendations 
There are many areas of uncertainty and further research is needed, 
for example, to reconcile the needs of security with those of escape 
in case of fire; to ascertain the relative effectiveness of different 
security measures; to ascertain the deterrent effects of measures; 
and many more. Resource requirements to conduct the research will be 
very high and the time scales very long, so priorities need to be 
carefully identified. Indeed the limited research resources available 
might well be better aimed at stimulating a reappraisal of attitudes 
to design for security by increasing awareness and providing guidance 
to specifiers and designers based on existing professional views, 
opinions and knowledge. 
More training for crime prevention officers who advise architects is 
needed, together with the award of a formal degree or other 
quaLification to candidates successfully completing such a course. 
Many Crime Prevention officers feel that they lack 'professional' 
status when advising construction professionals and suggest that a 
degree or diploma would give them more confidence and more authority. 
The work being carried out at the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre 
at Stafford is a beginning~ Their course structure and curriculum 
(Appendix 6) is well considered and broadly based and exposes the 
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police officers to other building .professionals~ But it must be seen 
as a beginning of an effort to achieve a formalised, acceptable, 
respected course leading to a formal professional qualification~ 
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CHAPTER 5 
CRIME PREVENTION - THE CURRENT SITUATION 
Chapter 5 
":.<:;-
Cri1ne Prevetltion - The Current Situation 
5.1 Introduction 
In an attempt to control the ever-increasing incidence of burglary and 
other crime against buildings, a number of initiatives have been 
introduced by the police, Home Office and other interested parties 
including the insurance industry in recent years. 
The main thrust of these.initiatives is to seek to involve the 
community as a whole-in crime prevention 1 .and to •reward' developers 
who employ crime. prevention techniques in the design of their housing 
schemes. 
This chapter describes some of these initiatives and their aims, but 
insufficient data has been published to enable their effectiveness to 
be assessed. In addition the responsibility for monitoring their 
performance as positive contributions to crime prevention is 
fragmented and unco-ordinated. It is doubtful, 'in the author's view, 
whether an assessment of their effectiveness would be possible in 
terms of statistics or any other scientific testing procedure. (See 
Chapter 2.4) 
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5.2.2 
THE "SECURED BY DESIGN" SCHEME(SBD) 
The Concept 
The objective of the 'SECURED BY DESIGN' campaign is to encourage 
the housebuilding industry to adopt recommended crime prevention 
guidelines in both home and estate design and thus gain an 
entitlement to use an official police-approved home security logo in 
their marketing of new homes. 
'SECURED BY DESIGN •_ has been created by Senior Crime Prevention 
Officers. This campaign, launched at Guildhall, City of London on 
7th June 1989 is supported by a number of local events. Concerted 
campaigns are.being mounted throughout the UK by.each of the 
participating_ police forces. 
The Association of Chief Police Officers and the Home Office Crime 
Prevention Unit fully support the campaign. The Home Office 
Minister· of State responsible for crime-prevention has been a firm 
ministerial sponsor of the scheme since its inception. 
Active Liaison 
Many police forces in the UK have now established facilities for 
close liaison with architects, building developers and local 
authority building departments as a means of extending crime 
prevention measures throughout the construction industry, and with 
particular reference to the risk to life and property of the 
occupants of new homes. 
Housebuilders have a reputation for adopting new criteria for 
excellence and they have been provided with important guidelines on 
the security of buildings against Crime through British Standard 
8220 (17), together with recommendations prepared by the National 
House-Building Council4 These guidelines can therefore provide 
reassurance for new home occupiers as violent crime and outrages 
against property continue to increase. But up to now security has 
not been regarded generally in the housebuilding industry as having 
a promotional value in the competitive business of selling new 
homes. 
The publication: 'Nf-IBC Guidance on how the security of new homes can 
be improved', is a major source document for the 'SECURED BY DESIGN' 
campa.ign. Therefore applications of the 'SECURED BY DESIGN' 
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criteria would, by implicatioQ, meet the NHBC minimum standards. 
Strategy Planned 
I ' 
Representatives from police crime prevention units have proposed a 
strategy for a major police initiative to stimulate the adoption by 
housebuilders of both the BS 8220, NHBC guidelines and well-proven 
crime reducing guidelines including estate design and lighting. 
The representatives established that the campaign should actively 
promote standards covering: estate design, such as defensible space, 
landscaping and natural surveillance; physical security such as the 
design of and security requirements for doors and windows; security 
lighting; smoke detectors and the installation of integral basic 
wiring for ~ntruder a.larms ... 
It was agreed that the campaign would be more manageable if first 
introduced on a regional basis in the South East rather than 
attempting immediately to launch a nationai initiative involving all 
police forces. It was also agreed that the necessary funding f~r 
the project would requi~e the participation of commercial interests. 
This,campaign, entitled 'SECURED, BY DESIGN' was to be the first 
cri~e prevention project jointly addressed by the Police Service in 
recognition that a combined initiative enabled them to be much more 
ambitious in their continuing fight against crime~ 
Literature & Video Film 
Thousands of 'SECURED BY DESIGN' literature. packs have been produced 
for individual distribution by crime prevention officers to 
hornebuilders, architects, planners and local authorities as part of 
a continuing programme of local presentations following the main 
launch. 
It was also decided to produce a 'SECURED BY DESIGNt video film, 
with copies to be made available to the participating police forces 
for local presentations. The video - which hQlpfully summarises the 
main features of the design criteria - was spec.iar'ly commissioned by 
the Association of British Insurers (AD!): the major association 
representing insurance companies. 
In 198-9, A13I members met claims for theft under household policies 
totalling (276.4 million. 
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ABI has been involved in crime prevention activities for many years 
and has worked with the Home Office as well as police forces and 
crime prevention panels nationwide. 
Home Office Recommendation 
Home Office Circular 44/1990 (39) states that, "in recent years it 
has been recognised that measures to reduce crime or the fear of 
crime cannot be left entirely to the police and the criminal justice 
system .... But the most significant advance has been the widespread 
adoption of the partnership model - the inter-agency approach to 
crime prevention.'' 
The 'SECURED BY DESIGN' campaign fully exemplifies the Home Office 
viewpoint by drawing together in one co-ordinated project: the 
participating police forces, suppliers, the construction industry, 
architects, insurance companies, local ~uthorities (through planning 
officers), and members of the public (new home buyers). 
The scale of this co-operation should make a major impact on both 
the fear of crime affecting new residential areas, thus improving 
the quality of life for many years to come of those the campaign is 
designed to benefit. 
Guidelines to Builders 
The objective of the 'SECURED BY DESIGN' campaign is to encourage 
the housebuilding industry to comply with recommended crime 
prevention guidelines and thus qualify for the free use of the new 
logo. 
The conditions and procedures for approval are as follows: 
1. Two copies of each house-type plan are submitted to a 
designated police officer together with an application form. 
2. The designated officer then prepares a list of recommendations 
- which invariably reflect NHBC guidelines, current British 
Standards, and The Architectural Liaison Manual advice. The 
officer may liaise with the appropriate manager in the 
company applying. 
3. Once approved, the designs are allocated an Approved Design 
reference number and details held on a central data base.. This 
means that only one application is made for any one design 
unless, of course, there are subsequent design alterations 
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affecting security. 
4. One copy of the plans of an Approved Design, following any 
rleCessary amendments, is returned to the developer. The 
allocated number should be used together with the design title 
in further correspondence with any of the participating police 
forces. 
5. Where a development consists of three or less houses of an 
Approved Design the developer is free to use the 'SECURED BY 
DESIGN' logo in advertising to denote police approval of the 
degree of security incorporated in the premises. 
6. Should a development comprise four or more houses and the 
developer wishes to indicate police approval of his project by 
use of the logo, then the designated police officer for the 
area in which the development is to be located is consulted in 
advance. 
7. Recommendations on estate design do NOT involve a reduction in 
the number of units. They are concerned with such 
environmental characteristics as defensible space including 
landscaping and natural surveillance. 
8. The police recommendations will take note of local authority 
planning strategies to avoid any conflict of views while 
incorporating the best practices in environmental design. Once 
the recommendations are accepted, advertising of the entire 
development can be supported by use of the 'SECURED BY DESIGN' 
logo. 
9. All recommendations provided by a designated police officer 
will be in accordance with statutory provisions, for example 
both fire and planning regulations. Should any conflict arise 
in this area, then the statutory provisions will prevail and 
the officer will amend his recommendations accordingly. The 
police will retain the right of access for inspection of 
Approved Design from commencement of building work to 
completion of sale. 
Qualifying Designs Publicity Opportunities & Restrictions 
A company that receives approval for a qualifying residential 
building design from a designated police officer is presented with a 
major publicity opportunity. through the free use of the official 
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'SECURED BY DESIGN' logo in its promotional material . 
. ' 
Effectiveness of "SECURED BY DESIGN" 
Pascoe (4) argues that the concept and original ideas of SBD were 
good to the extent that the scheme was originally perceived by 
designers as a fun~tional model to be applied in ways appropriate to 
each case. Thus, each new development, whilst incorporating crime 
prevention measure recommended through the SBD initiative, retained 
its individual character. This is clearly the correct approach 
since ·there are factors other than crime prevention which determine 
the configuration of buildings or groups of buildings.· For .example, 
site· topography, density planning constraints,. economics .and climate 
are influences which appear higher than crime prevention in the 
hierarchy of importance when planning an estate layout. 
In the author's view the "blanket approach" identified by Pascoe in 
his research, involving the use of a common template for •cul de 
sac:' solutions to- all new estate layouts is. too crude. Solutions to 
the problem of crime prevention must be 'site specific' whereby the 
individual cha~acteristics of each development .must be retained with 
crime prevention techniques carefully 'woven in' to the fabric of 
each scheme. 
Insufficient evidence exists to enable the statistical effectiveness 
of the SBD initiative to be ascertained, and more research is 
necessary. Such information as is available, however, encourages 
the police authorities to continue to promote the concept and to 
extend its coverage. Guide notes are now available for 
refurbishment works, car parks, and commercial premises. There i-s a 
need for further work to enable similar guidelines to be published 
for schools, colleges, leisure buildings and hotels. 
Any scheme which not only draws attention to the need for crime 
prevention, but offers advice on ways to achieve it must be 
commcnded. What is still lacking is the will on the part of the 
construction industry as a whole to embrace the concept in all new 
housing schemes voluntarily until future legislation compels them to 
do so. 48. 
5.3 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
Cr:·~me Prevention through environmental design acknowledges that the 
built environment can influence criminal behaviour for good or ill. 
It can also influence the citizen's ability to exercise cont~ol over 
his surroundings. 
Defen"sible space is concerned with enhancing those design features 
which support community interaction and good survei~lance, whilst 
simultaneously denying the criminal anonymity, unhindered access 
towards targets and-easy escape routes. 
The principles of defensible space have the advantage that they can 
be applied to existing housing areas and to developments at ·the 
planning stage. 
Many al:-chit€:ctural and Planning··-aecisions have been taken without 
reference to this philosophy and, in some· caSes, in. direct co!fflict 
with it;· and in c6nsequence.have contributed to the neighbourhood 
dete;-ioriation phenomenon - a state where uncon.trolled crime 
opportunities have resulted in a breakdown of the collective 
response of the Public, residential abandonment of environmental use 
and responsibility and an increase in the fear of crime. 
Some of the contributory causes have been the mass rehousing schemes 
of old stable communities, the introduction of cross town traffic 
routes through housing areas and the development of impersonal 
architectural styles, which militate against the principles of 
defensible space.(2). 
Greater care needs to ·be taken to make use of design concepts which 
nurture and extend the community's potential for territorial concern 
and its collective as well as individual responsibility and control. 
There is also a need to encourage balanced developn{Cnt of an area, 
and to avoid introducing generators of crime and those design 
features which .increase the fear of crime. 
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At this stage it will be helpful to provide definitions of the 
central tenets of the environmental approach to the subject·. 
Crime ,;prevention through environmental design is the creation 
through design of a physical environment conducive to the overall 
security of the community. It is achieved through the establishment 
of 'defensible space• by extending the citizens• area of territorial 
concern from private through to public space and includes the 
potential for community interaction and natural surveillance. 
Defensible Space 
Defensible space is the combination of real or symbolic barriers,. 
defined areas Of influence and improved opportunities for 
surveillance which; together, bring·an environment under the control 
of.its residents. Four levels of space are recognised- private, 
serni-private 1 semi-public, public. 
a) Private Space is the area of space under the total control 
of the occupant and not visually or physically accessible 
.· to the public, e.g. the inside of a home or private office. 
b) Semi-Private Space is that area of space under the control of 
the occupa;.,t, but is visually and physically accessible to the 
public, e.g. the garden of a house. 
c) Semi-Public Space is that area of space under the control or 
within the area of· responsibility of a specific group of 
occupants and is accessible to the public, e.g. hallways 
and lobbies of multi-occupancy flats, common recreation and 
parking areas of multiple housing complexes. 
d) Public Space is that area of space to which the public has 
access by right, e.g. a road. 
Defined Areas of Influence (territoriality) 
As a general rule the degree of influence exercised by an individual 
over the environment is very high in the private ahd semi-private 
areas, but diminishes proportionately towards the semi-public and 
publlc space end of the spectrum. 
It follows that, in order ~o increase this beneficial influence, 
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~here are advantages in creating semi-public areas from public areas 
and semi-private ones from semi-public~ 
How ca,n this be- achieved? A good example of changing semi-public '.:o 
semi-private is the use of voice entry phones in the entrance halls 
of multi-storey flats~ Another is extending a gardened area around 
a house or flat thereby minimising the adjacent semi-;-:public area. 
Similarly public areas can be changed into semi-public by symbolic 
closure of streets using paved areas, portals and n~rrowing of 
entrances. The object of the exercise is to enhance the feelings of 
territoriality in the. residents. 
Each o_f us has territorial needs, space ove·r which we· have a sense 
of control ·and for which we -are will-i.ng to show concern. This basic 
need becomes evident in the ernotiqns we feel when someone .occupies 
space over which we have staked a claim - our favourite chair# our 
usual place at the dinner table·, our regular··.parking place at work. 
A stranger parked for a lengthy period outsi?e of our house is 
usually cause for.a higher level of reaction- curiosity, suspicion, 
concern and possibly ac~ion, are typical responses to this kind of. 
violation of our defined space. It is the capacity of our physical 
envir.onment to create. ~reas of territorial influence that. is 
referred to as territoriality~ 
Community Interaction 
Community Interaction is a term used to_describe the process of 
people getting to know their neighbours and being concerned about 
them. 
Many urban districts consist of multi-occupancy houses and high rise 
flats, which create vast areas of anonymity. 
These designs reduce the potential for resident communication and 
interaction. They also have the effect of reducing·· the resident's 
level of concern beyond his own private space. 
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In single family houses it is not uncommon for neighbours to enjoy a 
caring relationship, which can be used to advantage~ Conversely in 
some high rise flats it is not uncommon for residents not to know 
neighbours on the same floor. 
It is 'in ·the areas of anonymity, i.e. community areas, lifts, 
stairs, entrances, lobbies, that the criminal finds the protection 
required for freedom of movement towards easy targets~ 
Natural Surveil1ance 
However interested residents are in the welfare of their neighbours, 
there is small chance of their being able to reduce the criminals' 
opportuniti~s, unless they have a clear an~ unobstructed view of the 
neighbourfs house~ 
It is possible to create, by design, an atmosphere in which the 
criminal feels uncomfortable and exposed. 
A simple example is the country village. If a stranger walks down 
the main street he may be aware that many eyes are upon him. 
Creating that village atmosphere in an urban area can be achieved by 
clustering houses using square configurations .and culs-de-sac, or by 
offsetting houses so that they can be more easily observed, or by 
creating semi-private areas by the use of shrubs and landscaping. 
Target Hardening 
Target Hardening is the term used to describe the increasing of the 
physical security of a potential crime target by installing locks, 
alarms, fencing# lighting and other devices in order to build a 
resistance to crime. 
This process can be thought of as an integral part of crime 
prevention through environmental design. For example, it is far 
better to prevent access to the rear of a house by siting gates and 
fencing than to allow unhindered access to the criminal. 
Furthermore it is an example of creating a private area from a 
semi-private thus increasing th-e owner~s feelings of ter.-r:itociality. 
Good lighting, too, creates a feeling of vulnerability in the mind 
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of the criminal and is to be recommended. But if the principles of 
target hardening are developed to the exclusion of other preventive 
strategies, there is a danger of producing a fortress society where 
the public retreat behind their defences and become less interested 
in the safety of their neighbours. 
The Wider Implications of Crime Prevention Through Environmental 
Design 
Whilst the concept of crime prevention through environmental design 
can be applied to housing, it has a wider application as it relates 
to the planning decisions for whole areas. 
Planning Authorities have a responsibility for ensuring the balanced 
development of an area, so avoiding the problems that can be 
generated by providing facilities disproportionate to the needs of 
the community. 
Planning Authorities have to take into account the requirements for 
housing, education, shopping, employment, recreation facilities, 
community facilities and road access. 
Many of these decisions have a direct bearing on the crime 
generators. Much could be achieved by the crime prevention 
practitioner intervening at the planning stage and offering advice 
as to the potential for crime reduction by adopting certain courses 
of action in environmental design. What does this entail and how 
can it be tackled? 
In dealing with the relationship between opportunity crimes and the 
physical environment, the neighbourhood is the natural geographic 
and social unit to deal with it. It is the area where the residents 
know one another and where they might be prepared to co-operate with 
one another. It is also a natural extension of the territoriality 
which begins at home. 
The neighbourhood is also the scale at which the opportunity for 
crimes can be denied to the criminal. Newrnan (2) says that, if 
crime cannot be controlled at the neighbourhood level, it can 
eventually undermine the city. 
In order to identify the causes of neighbourhood crime, it is 
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necessary to first determine what characterises a successful 
neighbourhood, and then see how the characteristics have been eroded 
allowiQg crime to flourish. 
The characteristics as defined by the police (ALO's) might include:-
a) A place where the individual can exercise certain rights 
including control over his house and its immediate 
surroundings. 
b) A place where standards of acceptable community behaviour are 
upheld and maintained by informal social control. 
c) The existence of essential support services, e.g. schools, 
shops, libraries and health centres. 
d) A sense.of belonging, resulting from physical boundaries 
to the area. 
e) Pride of home and-neighbourhood, which may be- expressed 
in the maintenance of private property~ 
f) Investment in a home or business. 
g) A sense of security, which is part of the notion of home 
being a safe place. 
Home Office research (22) suggests that in a crime ridden area some 
or all of these characteristics have broken down. 
The development of surburbia, the mass- movement of communities from 
traditional neighbourhoods, the provision of impersonal environments 
where the residents do not know one another, the use of hitherto 
semi-private streets as cross town traffic-routes, the development 
of neighbourhood schools and shopping areas into regional facilities 
to cater for a wider population, lead to uncontrolled use of, and 
movement through, the area and competition for the use of 
residential streets. 
This leads to a breakdown of the semi-private nature of an area and 
the group standards of behaviour that have been developed. It also 
provides opportunity for potential offenders to come and go 
unquestioned, resulting in opportunities for offenders to commit 
crimes. Consequently residents are unable to distinguish between 
neighbour and non resident, and they can begin to feel isolated and 
afraid. These conditions have a multiplier effect, the more 
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offences are committed, the more the victim becomes isolated from 
his neighbours, resulting in him giving up the use of the streets 
and caus.ing him to retreat behind locked doors. The abandonment of 
the st1reets to the offenders provides the opportunity not only for 
street crimes, but for property crimes also. 
The residents lack of responsibility for their area expresses itself 
in a disinterest in property maintenance, property investment, pride 
of ownership and eventual movement from the area. In consequence it 
is possible to see, for· example, some areas where it is impossible 
to let publicly rented housing because the people are too frightened 
to live there. Because the units cannot be let, the revenue 
decreases so that the Local Authority cannot afford to carry out 
necessary repairs. 
The area takes on an uncared for appearance, encouraging further 
vandalism. Those people who remain in the area become increasingly 
fearful of crime, they·lose all pride in· the area and are concerned 
only for their own safety. The streets are left to the criminals. 
In order to avoid these possible developments, there is a need for a 
comprehensive planning process which takes into account the needs of 
the community, recognises the significance of neighbourhoods, 
provides balanced-support services, discourages the use of 
residential streets as traffic through routes, provides adequate 
policing, encourages resident participation in crime prevention, 
makes use of design concepts which enhance territoriality and 
provides adequate security for the buildings. 
Situational Approaches 
One method of tackling the problem is to adopt a situational 
approach. In other words, a specific problem is identified and the 
physical environment at that place is altered to make it less easy 
for the criminal to operate. Examples of this philosophy are set 
out in Chapter 3, Section 3.2. 
This is considered by crime prevention officers as a legitimate 
means of tackling the problem and can be extremely effective in the 
sort of circumstances described, but it is sometimes necessary to 
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5.3.10 
take a broader approach to the--problem# for example:-
a) Why is it that crime is more prevalent in one area than 
anqther? To discover the answer, it.js first necessary to 
identify the patterns of crime and to determine who is 
responsible for committing them. 
b) For example, do the offenders and the victims live in the area 
or are they from outside? 
c) Are they neighbour to neighbour crimes? 
It is only when these questions have been answered ~hat 
consideration can be given to possible solution. 
Crime Generators 
There ,is a need then to identify those types of loca-tion and 
build~ng.which can generate opportunities for crime. 
There are· four crime gerierator::( and they can be categorised as 
follows: 
a) .Known crime generators - hot spots, or areas at which crime 
is known to occur ~requently, for example, known offenOer 
hang-outs such as pubs and clubs. 
b) Service generators - facilities-which attract potential 
victims as well as potential offenders, for example, open 
spaces or hospitals. 
c) Movement generators ~ circulation systems which attract 
conflicting user traffic, for example, subway systems, 
bus stop and pedestrian walkways. 
d) Fear generators - elements which provoke fear of crime, 
for example, alleys and large unmanned parking areas. 
Environmental Balance 
In order to create a relatively crime-free residential area there is 
a need for environmental balance. If there is imbalance, 
competition for use and conflict can result~ 
possibility of territoriality being achieved. 
and can reduce the 
Some examples of imbalance identified by crime prevention officers 
are:-
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a) Out of scale support system - a neighbourhood street has 
been redesigned to carry cross town traffic, resulting in 
the ·breakdown of the semi-private character of the 
neighbourhood and use of the area by non residents. 
b) Out of scale support element - a neighbourhood park provides 
a large open space for football, skate boarding, BMX bicycle 
riding, etc. Because of a lack of recreational facilities 
in neighbouring areas the park draws young adults from other 
areas. 
c) Land use conflict - a neighbourhood shopping area has been 
enlarged to attract surburban commuters resulting in the 
need for increased parking in a residential neighbourhood, 
competition for use of pavements and public services. 
There is seldom just one element out of scale .. and so a neighbourhood 
can have many environmental conflicts which provide opportunities 
for would-be offenders. Each conflict can precipitate a pattern of 
crime. 
To qchieve environmental security, there must be balanced 
development, adequate support systems and a development whose design 
encourages commUnity interaction. 
Crime prevention through environmental design and defensible space 
have been practised with varying degrees of success for a number of 
years. The concepts have potential and form the basis of advice 
offered to developers, planners and architects as one of the means 
by which crime can be prevented or reduced. 
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5.4 Institute of Architectural Studies (I.A.S.) 
The institute, part of the University of York, devises educational 
programmes for architects, in the form of courses leading to a 
higher degree., or shorter modul8s related to the requirements for 
graduate .architects to pursue a continuous p~ogramme of professional 
development. 
One of the subjects offered by the I.A.S. is the study of crime 
prevention by design in the form of short residential courses at the 
University. 
T4e University of York does not, howeVer, have a faculty .of 
architecture within the undergraduate campus and the author .feels 
that all undergraduate.architectural students should· receive 
instruction in crime prevention techniques as part of the normal 
diploma course·. ·The subject should be compulsory and not voluntary 
as it is at the York I.A.S. Aspiring architects need to consider 
crime prevention aspects of design in projects designed as part of· 
their academic course. 
The Institute does, however, publish useful information on designing 
and~crime, and its video entitled 11 Safe as Houses 11 (40) is a well 
scripted ?nd informative visual aid. It e~phasises the importance 
at design stage·· of:-
a) Analysing the risk 
b) Designing to deter 
Analysing the risks involves the study of the local environment and 
its potential for crime.·· Factors such as proximity to main roads, 
'hot spots' such as .pubs and night clubs, easy escape routes, large 
open spaces, car parks need to be considered when trying to assess 
the risk of crime affecting a n~w development. 
In "designing to deter" the architect should take account of:-
a) avoiding potential hiding places 
b) providing good lighting 
c) avoiding recessed porches 
d) avoiding planting which encroaches on foOtpaths 
e) providing car accommodation with dwelling unit and 
avoiding large car parks 
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f) keeping access (and escape) points to a minimum 
g) defining "publicu and "private" spaces 
h). avoiding concealed entrances 
1.) · avoiding aids to clirqbing 
The video only applies to residential building but it is understood 
that consideration is being given to producing similar visual aids 
appropriate to non-residential building types. 
Neighbourhood Watch 
Objectives: 
Neighbourhood Watch· schemes represent an attempt to involve 
residents in a specific neighbourhood in crime prevention. The 
purpose is twofold, i~e. to formaliSe the process of natural 
surveillance, So that suspicious behaviour can be reported to the 
police and also to help remove feelings of helplessness in the face 
of increasing crime by mobilising the 'eyes and ears' of specific 
residential areas. 
Schemes normally begin when the local police or residents perceive a 
cri~e problem, usually in the form of burglaries, vandalism or car 
crime and express a wish to do something about it. 
The main purpose of Neighbourhood Watch schemes as published in the 
pamphlets issued by the local police watch co-ordinator is:-
1. To make people feel more secure because they can see 
that action against crime is being taken 
2. To channel the natural inquisitiveness of residents into 
positive surveillance and accurate reporting of suspicious 
actions. 
3. To exchange information .on methods of increasing the 
security of their homes. 
4. To make available equipment for post-coding 
property. 
5. To persuade neighbours to notify each other when leaving 
their premises to go on holiday. 
The scheme was first established irl 1982 in Cheshire, and there are 
now some 90000 watch schemes throughout the country covering 3.5 
million households. Each scheme appoints a co-ordinator to arrange 
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regular meetings and liaise with the local police4 
Sirnila~ schemes exist on some industrial estates, farms and marinas 
the obj'ec.tives being ider,tical with those of housing neighbourhoods 
- to encourage natural surveillance of adjoining properties and to 
report unusual or suspicious circumstances to the police4 
The effectiveness of such schemes is a subject of much debate 
amongSt crime prevention professionals, and no statistics ar.e 
available to support their usefulness as a deterrent,,4 The generally 
accepted view of the schemes by the police is positive but the main 
problem is maintaining the enthusiasm of the general public for 
them. On balance the author feels that public participation in crime 
prevention is worthwhile, but to be more effective there ·needs to be 
a greater involvement by the professionals in a co-ordinating role, 
or alternatively, the post should.be paid rather than voluntary4 
The frequent turnover of individuals in the post-at present reduces 
the overall effectiveneSs of a 9roup. Crime prevention needs 
resources, financial and human, if significant.pro~ress is to be 
made towards reductions in crime. against property. 
Insurance Initiatives 
The insurance ihdustry has produced many statistics {31) relating to 
burglary in domestic premi&es which form the basis of its general 
policy towards incentives to policy holders who increase the 
security of their houses. One large insurer reports that whilst l 
in 12 of its po1icy holders will make a claim following a burglary, 
only 1 in 75 of Neighbourhood Watch members. will make such a claim. 
It offers, therefore, specially reduced premiums, often by as much 
as 40% to Watch members, subject to a security survey of their 
property. 
Other large companies, whilst not offering discounts to watch 
members, will reduce the premiums of policy holders who fit 5-lever 
mortice locks on their external doors, or have an intruder alarm 
system installed by an approved firm. 'Excess' clauses by which the 
insured will undertake to pay the first L250 of any claim will 
qualify for a 1.5% premium reduction by one major insurer. 
Insurers are, becoming increasingly concerned by the rate at which 
claims arc increasing, both in the residential and non-residential 
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sectors, particularly since it is alleged by them (31) that of the 
1440 burglaries that occur daily in the UK only one in three 
involves forced entry. 
Thirty years ago the author know~. that local authorities, for 
exampl~; did not insure their property since they found it cheaper 
to meet the cost of the occasional break-in or fire in one of their 
buildings than to pay an annual premium. That situation has changed 
and insurers are now having to meet the cost of the p"roliferation of 
criminal damage, theft, vandalism and arson in a wider range of 
public buildings. Schools, particularly those built since the late 
1950's, on an open campus site appear particularly vUlnerable, 
especially since the vast majority of. such buildings are 
system-built, and, due to the lightness of their construction are 
more vulnerable. 
Older, traditionally constructed schools in an urban location, 
without surrounding playing fields are less frequently attacked. 
In view of this, insurers have taken the initiative in requiring 
that local authorities carry out a •risk survey• of their buildings 
in·order to identify weakness and take appropriate action to improve 
security. This is a formidable task but essential to ensure that 
insurance cover can be maintained. 
In addition, insurers are insisting on vetting initial plans of new 
schemes being prepared by local authority architects to ensure that 
the required standards of security are being "designed in''. 
To extend such a scheme to the whole field of new construction seems 
sensible but currently beyond the resources of the insurance 
industry. The author believes that insurers could assist the police 
and others to lobby the government in a campaign to have crime 
prevention measures supported by Act of Parliament. 
Street Patrols 
The government ttas announced that the Home Office is considering 
extending the Neighbourhood Watch concept to enable local "Watch" 
groups to mount street patrols 1.-1ithin their areas. Reaction to this 
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proposal is mixed, the general feeling being expressed is that such 
activities are best left to the police. In some inner-city areas 
and crime prone housing estates in the less affluent neighbourhoods, 
residents have already formed themselves into 'foot' patrols to 
promote active surveillance within their areas, but the idea is not 
supported by the police who fear that it could lead to street 
violence. Similarly, security firms are being employed by more 
affluent groups to perform a similar function with the aquiescence, 
if not the support of the local constabulary~ No statistics exist 
to confirm the effectiveness of such groups in reducing the 
incidence of local crime, and the insUrance industry is not 
generally·impressed by the idea (See 5.2). 
5.8 Crime Concern 
Objectives 
Crime Concern, a non-profit making company, was set up·in response 
to the 1987 Government manifesto policy to "build on the support of 
the public by establishing a national organisation to promote the 
best practices in local crime· preVention initiativestt. Although . 
sugported.initially by the Home Office it now looks towards local 
industry and commerce for financial support~ Its objectives as set 
out in their p~licity brochure (41) are:-
a) Reducing opportunities for crime 
b) Creating stronger communities in which "individuals are 
less likely to offend. 
c) Improving the quality of life by supporting and 
developing efficient crime prevention. 
No evidence has been produced to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
the organisation which appears to duplicate much of the work of the 
police. Nor is the author aware of any specific initiatives in the 
relationship between crime and building design. 
5.9 National House Building Council 
Since June 1988, National House Building Council (NHBC) has included 
security measures in its Technical Requirements. some of which are 
mandatory. 
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Objectives: Any builder wishing to offer the NHBC's ten year 
guarantee must fulfil the mandatory security requirements. 
The mandatory requirements include:-
A main entrance door to a minimum of 44 mm thickness overall. 
Doors and windows to be fitted with devices to "improve their 
resistance to unauthorised entry" 
A door viewer {or other means of giving a wide angle view from 
the main entrance door). 
Patio door locks. 
Front door limiter or chain. 
One or more front door locks to BS 3621 (or an equivalent in terms 
of physical strength requirements}. 
Door bolts to top and bottom. 
On secondary {back or side) doors a minimum 5-lever l-ock and bolts 
top and bottom. 
Window locks on all ground floor and accessible windows which cannot 
be released without a key. 
Crimestoppers 
Joint initiative between independent charity Community Action Trust 
(CAT} and the Metropolitan Police in conjunction with the media. 
Objectives: 
This scheme was launched in the London Metropolitan area in January 
1988 with TV/Newspaper publicity to encourage the public to supply 
anonymous information related in particular to crimes of violence, 
via a freephone number. A cash reward, if offered, is drawn from 
donated funds (both public and business community contributions) for 
information leading to arrest and charges. 
Structure 
A Crimestoppers Board which is made up of representatives from the 
community (usually business) raises and adrniriisters funds. Rewards 
are decided on the basis of reports and investigations by a police 
co-ordinator. 
The initial involvement included the Evening Standard newspaper, 
Thames TV and LWT along with radio station LBC and Capital. 
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Expansion 
Since _1988 & nationwide programme has been launched covering the 
whole,· of. England, Scotland and Wales. There are now 12 regional 
Crimestoppers offices. 
Arson Prevention Bureau (APB) 
Set up by the Home Office and Association of British Insurers in 
February 1991. 
Objective - to spearhead a national programme of initiatives to 
prevent and control arson. 
The Bureau is working to raise standards of fire investigation .by. UK 
fire brigades, the police and public and private forensic science-
services. 
Arson ·is a growing extension of the pattern of crime against 
buildings and·the Bureau has identified the following statistics: 
a) , In 1990 one in forty schools was deliberately set alight,. 
in most cases as part of a burglary attempt. 
b} 2000 serious injuries and fatalities are caused each year 
by arson. 
c) One in four building fires (about 23,000 per year) are 
started deliberately. 
d) The insurance industry estimates that 10% of the total cost 
of arson in the UK consists.of fraudulent claims following 
arson attacks. 
A APB working group set up to identify buildings at greatest risk 
from arson, inform owners and managers, encourage them to take 
action, and organise advice, seminars and courses·~ 
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5~12 Safer Cities Initiatives 
This was launched March 1988 as part of Government's Action for Cities 
initiativef the objectives being to encourage local people to run local 
multi-agency projects to improve community safety. 
20 projects have been established - Birmingham, Bradford, Coventry, 
Derby, Fulham, Hammersmith, Hartlepool, Hull, Islington, 
Leicester,Lewisham, Middlesborough, Nottingham, Rochdale, Salford, 
Sunderland, Tower Hamlets, Wandsworth, Wirral and Wolverhampton. 
The criteria for participation are: 
high crime rates 
sociojeconomic problems 
receive urban grants or other Government support~ 
The Home Office has so far made available £250,000 for each project for 
12 month operation period. It also supports Safer Cities financially by 
funding project staff salaries, office accommodation, equipment, running 
costs, central research and evaluation work and some local publicity and 
survey .costs. 
A total of £llm in Home Office grant money has been provided in support 
of Safer Cities to date. 
5.13 Home Office Crime Prevention Campaign 1991 
A crime prevention week, with local activity emphasis was held from 
April 15 - 21 1991. E'unded from the 1991/92 budget of £6m, it was based 
on Theme Days. 
These covered Car Crime Youth Action, Business and Crime, Personal 
Safety and Violence (including Women's safety), Home Security and 
Neighbourhood Watch. 
Initiatives during the week included the launch of the Horn~ Office Car 
Theft Index, distribution of the handbook "Practical Ways to Crack 
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Crime" and other literature, TV advertising and the announcement that 
the next British Crime Survey, which is based on people's experience of 
cri~e, including those unreported, rather than on police statistics, 
would be i•n· 1992. 
Co-ordinated nationally by the Home Office and locally by Crime 
Prevention Officers. 
5.14 Home Office Crack Crime Campaign 
Slogan: "Crime -together we'll crack it~" 
Investment from government -·£llm over three years. 
Phase One: 
Advertising campaign 11 ! want to grow up in a place~ •. ~~, used children to 
make an emotional connection on the theme .of .hope for future 
generations. 
Objectives: 
To creat:e awareness of and positive attitudes towards a whole range o'f 
crime prevention techniques, encouraging positive action in the crime 
prevention field. 
Phase Two: 
This phase was more specifically targeted at the general public, 
bUsiness builders and local authorities. 
The handbook "Practical Ways to Crack Crime" was produced. Over 3.5m 
copies have been distributed. 
The campaign seems to answer questions about getting involved in crime 
prevention, and gives advice on protection in different areas including 
safety and security of the family, burglary in the home, and preventing 
theft of possessions_ It also gives ideas for getting involved in crime 
prevention. 
A shorter "Family" version is now available in English, Welsh, Gujarati, 
Urdu, Bengali, Hindi and Cantonese plus tape cassette versions for .the 
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blind or partially sighted. Over 3 m English copies, 75,000 special 
language editions and 9,000 cassettes have been distributed. 
Objectives: 
To generate a positive attitude to crime prevention in the general 
public, opinion leaders and specific community groups. 
To create a greater awareness among all sections of the community of the 
whole range of preventative action which can reduce opportunities for 
property and violent crime. 
To build and maintain positive attitudes towards crime prevention 
without exacerbating fear of crime. 
Phase ·Three: Launched February 1992 .. 
1992 designed Car Crime Prevention Year. Slogan Car Crime - together 
we'll Crack It. Supported by nearly 80 companies, and £3.6m already 
pledged for schemes. 
£Sm advertising and promotional campaign compares car criminals with 
scaveng~ng hyenas. 
Home Office holding top level meetings with car manufacturers - aim to 
ensure that by the end of 1992, all new cars.fitted with effective 
vehicle immobilisers, high grade deadlocking and visible identification 
numbers. 
5.15 The Situation Abroad 
Underwood (14) finds that the most active and imaginative work is being 
carried out in Canada and Holland, with Canada having gone some way 
towards regulating crime prevention by introducing mandatory 
requirements in single family dwellings. 
At a practical level, the concept of "target hardening'' is the single 
rnost widely used crime prevention technique. Attempts .. to establish 
clear connections between crime and building design have not been too 
successful though most countries appear to recognise thai a link exists 
even though much work remains to be done to translate ideas into 
practical guidelines. 
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Some countries appear to concentrate more on the criminal and the 
deterrence of his activity before the building design/crime interface is 
reached. Social and psychological factors are held to be equally 
important in finding a method of countering the ever increasing crime 
incidence in the developed countriesA 
5.16 Conclusions 
Whilst the author applauds the ever increasing concern for crime 
prevention which is apparent from the number of different initiatives 
referred to in this chapter, the research which forms the basis of this 
thesis does not suggest that the message is getting across to the.people 
who matter, i.e. building owners and architects. In the final analysis 
the advice offered and the information published by the agencies 
responsible can only be advisory, and a very large proportion of such 
property owners, householders, developers and architects seem to be 
unwilling or too preoccupied with other problems to accept and implement 
the advice freely available. 
In all new, non-domestic construction, Fire Prevention Officers are 
consulted at early design stage to ensure the provision of adequate and 
proper means of escape in the event of fire~ Their recommendations in 
this connection are supported by statute and are non-negotiable. 
Retrospective fire protection is also provided in certain classes of 
building functional type prior to the issue of a Fire Certificate. 
Crime Prevention must also be brought within the legislative process, 
enabling Building Control to check and monitor the inclusion of crime 
prevention measures in all new buildingsA 
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CASE STUDY, NORTH SHERWOOD STREET 
Chapter 6 
CASE STUDY, NORTH SHERWOOD STREET 
6.1 Introduction 
In an attempt to draw together the twin disciplines of architecture and 
crime prevention so that each may contribute -to a wider understanding of 
the principles of "designing out crime", Nottingham University School of 
Architecture and the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit have formed a 
unique partnership. Unique because enquiries have failed to reveal 
similar iniatives in other schools of architecture and a partnership 
because of the value of the combination of different skills each partner 
can offer. 
The mutual co-operation normally takes the form of seminars for 
architectural liaison officers from various police authorities organised 
and run by the School of Architecture. (A programme for such a seminar 
is shown in Appendix- 5) -.. The principal objectives. of the. seminar.s are: 
a) To show the police officers a series of slides of buildings, 
historic and .. modern; and explain the factors which appeared to 
influence their form, and to-try to illustrate the architect 1 s 
design philosophyw The purpose.of this exercise is to introduce 
the police officers to. the architectural language he is likely to 
meet during one to one encounters with architects. 
b) To visit an existing housing estate, and. by a visual inspection, 
identify weaknesses in planning and construction and make notes 
accordingly. On the return to the University prepare and deliver 
a short talk to the whole group setting out, by the use of normal 
visual aids, the shortcomings-of the built estate together with 
recommendations for better crime prevention measures. 
The author has attended such seminars and was impressed by the 
level of enthusiasm of the police officers in fOllowing the 
syllabus, but acutely conscious of some apprehension on their part. 
They perceive architects as well educated professionals who deal in 
abstract concepts and speak a different "language". It may be 
difficult for s9me of them to penetrate the veil of 'mystique' 
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which surrounds many professionals unless they are very confident 
and articulate in expressing their opinions~ Architects, on the 
other hand, are well accustomed to dealing with fire officers and 
similar specialists who have no professional qualifications but 
whose knowledge is recognised as being vital~ 
The University is organising a similar event for the benefit of the 
local Society of Architects in an attempt to increase awareness of, 
and interest in designing out crime. 
6•1.1 Objectives 
In selecting this particular estate as a case study the author 1 s 
objectives were to assess the scope for the application of crime 
prevention techniques to an existing residential estate. 'Additionally, 
from a study of the configuration of the units, access points, road 
layouts and car parking areas, lessons may be learned which could 
influence future estate planning. 
Those best qualified to consider these matters are the police officers 
responsible for advising architects, and the author was priveleged to 
accompany groups of officers when they inspected the estate~ 
The information gainsed has been invaluable in producing this thesis. 
6.2 Estate Profile 
6.2.1 Architectural Profile (Figs. land 2)) 
The North Sherwood Street Estate was built for the North British Housing 
Association and was completed in 1981. It consists of 70 one-bedroom 
flats in two-storey blocks, and 119 two and three bedroom flats in 20 
three-storey blocks. In the two-storey blocks one flat is set above 
another, the upper flat being accessed by an open timber staircase~ 
Both upper and lower flats have their own separate yard for drying 
washing or cultivating~ 
Each three-storey block contains six flats accessed by a communal 
staircase which leads directly from an estate footpathA One ground 
floor flat, 19 North Sherwood Street, has been converted into the Estate 
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Management Office. Out of the total of 198 flats, 8 have been bought 
under the right to buy scheme, and a further 25 ground floor flats are 
identified as 'Category l' converted for mobility ·purposes~ 
A most striking feature of the estate is that, though it is an 
inner-city estate, the physical appearance of both the buildings and the 
landscaping is very good in general. Apart from the yards to the 
two-storey flats, all the remainder of the estate is 'public' space 
maintained by the Housing Association by means of a service charge to 
tenants~ There has been extensive bush and tree planting across the 
estate, both of which now grow vigorously. 
As well as the positive side, the layout of the estate has some 
potentially problematic features. The open.layout of the estate and the 
differing ·orienta~ions of the blocks mean that· there are an ·incredible 
14 diffefent pedestrian routes into the estate, including 3 which are 
also car access; making the estate very vulnerable to people cutting 
through. Since it was built 10 years ago the limited amount of car 
parking space on the estate-now appears inadequate, though this seems 
partly due to the number of people who use the ·estate as a car park for 
the Not~ingham Polytechnic or the city centre. Two very basic 
children•s play areas are placed within the estate, one on Dundas Close, 
one on Ossing-ton close. 
The estate is bounded by a nursery and the Polytechnic Library to the 
South, the other boundaries being marked by North Sherwood Street, Peel 
Street and Dryden Street. The land rises up fairly steeply from the 
bottom of the estate to the top, at Peel Street. Due to the slope, but 
despite the generally open nature of the estate, there is only one 
footpath between the top half of the estate (Alrna and Ossington Closes) 
and the bottom half around Dundas Close. This tends to give the estate 
a divided feel, particularly as the Dundas Close area, has historically 
had more elderly residents and often seems quieter. 
6.2.2 Social Profile 
The social profile of North Sherwood Street Estates population is 
broadly as to be expected for an estate of its size and location 
although it has been moulded over the years by the changing allocation 
policies pursued by the estate.1 s owner, the North British Housing 
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Association~ When the first tenants were allocated from 1980 (before 
the actual completion of the estate) residents were selected according 
to traditional grounds of respectability, suitability, etc. In the 
early 198'0' s· a brOadly need~; based allocation system was adopted 
although it is probable that allocations were made with the previous 
'culture of reference' still firmly in mind. In January 1988 a new 
points system was introduced allocating property purely to those who 
satisfied criteria of greatest need. Beside this residents can come to 
the estate through the mutual exchange system that North British 
operates with other housing associations and local authorities. This 
puts into perspective the·view expressed by some of those who have lived 
longer on the-estate that 'the estate's going down· hill' or that 'people 
should be vetted more carefully before being housed here'. 
Since the change in lettings policy in 1988 tenant turnover has 
increased from about 6.5% in the mid 1980's to nearly 12% per annum 
since 1988. This in some way reflects the greater mobility of the 
client groups now being catered for but also makes the creation of a 
feeling of 'social stability' less easy~ However, whilst noting the 
increase it would be wrong to suggest ·that the levels of turnover are 
particularly high. Since the start of collection of data on household 
type and ethnic origin in 1988 just under 20% of new tenancies have 
been allocated to black householders, just over 70% to whites. The 
majority of new tenancies are allocated to either single people of 
working age (30%), single parents with young children (23%), couples of 
working age (17%) or couples with young children (9%). Other client 
groups such as the elderly or disabled account for most of the 
remainder. However it must be stressed that such data are collected at 
the commencement of the tenancy and, of course, people will move between 
categories during their time as residents but the records are not 
updated. 
33% of tenants are in receipt of full, and 10% partial, Housing Benefit. 
the former probably mostly being .income support claimants. These 
figures represent Housing Benefit paid directly to the association on 
behalf of the tenant, and not housing benefit paid directly to the 
tenant, the existence of which is unknown, but likely to increase the 
overall figures by a small amount. This compares favourably with a 
similar North British Estate, Raleigh Street, where 50% of tenants have 
their entitlement to full Housing Benefit paid directly to the Housing 
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Association~ This in some ways reflects the greater mobility of the 
client groups now being catered for but also makes the creation of a 
feeling of. 'social stability' less easy. However, whilst noting the 
increase it would be wrong to suggest that the levels of turnover are 
particularly high. 
Whilst over three quarters of tenants are in rent arrears, the majority 
of this involves amounts less than two weeks rent (42% of those in 
arrears are only one week in arrears). In many cases this is simply 
explained by delayed, or out of step payments of Housing Benefit. 
Nevertheless about 30% of tenants are over 5 weeks in arrears. Overall, 
however, rent arrears are about 5% of the Rent Roll. (or the total amount 
that should be collected) which is average for the Associations Stock in 
the region. 
Of ·course, over time the change in .lettings policy will have a· marked. 
effect on the population and social composition of the estate. However 
currently it has produced a mixed population of elderly, single or 
working couples and young families.that perhaps do not always see their 
interest as the same. 
(Figures supplied by North British Housing Association). 
The layout of the estate as built is shown in Fig. 1. Layouts of 
existing house types are shown in Fig. 2. 
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6.3 Methodology 
There were twenty four aspiring architectural liaison officers· present 
at the seminar held on 21st July 1993 1 all from pqlice forces in the 
West Mid~and~, and all of whom had had experience as crime prevention 
officers. 
Also present were the director of the Home Office Crime Prevention 
Centre who have the responsibility for training ALO's, a senior lecturer 
from the Department of Architecture and the author. 
Following the initial lecture with slides referred to above the whole 
group transferred to the housing estate and were divided into six groups 
of four officers. 
The groups were given one hour to walk the estate, conduct random and 
informal interviews with a total of twenty residents, identify and 
record weaknesses in design, layout and construction. -The ·author 
accompanied one of the groups. Due to the size of the estate and ·the 
enthusiasm of the police officers the time over-ran and the remainder of 
the programme was put back by one hour. 
On return to the University, the group discussed and collated their 
findings, and one member of each group appointed to deliver a ten minute 
talk to the whole assembly to explain the findings of his group. 
The Report (33) previou~ly complied by the University following a survey 
by two of their post graduate students and the Nottingham Police 
Authority crime prevention officers was to be used as a datum for 
comparison. 
6.4 Crime Statistics on the Estate 
The crime figures provided by Nottinghamshire Constabulary need to be 
interpreted with care. Firstly, they only relate to one year (1990), 
the last full year for which figures were available. This means it is 
not possible to analyse trends over time. Secondly, they only include 
recorded crime, much crime is unreported and a small amount of reported 
crime goes unrecorded {mostly concerning 'trivi.al 1 offences). 
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Table 1: The 1988 British Crime Survey gives estimates of the 
percentage of crimes recorded. 
Offence % recorded 
Vandalism 10% 
Burglary 41% 
attempts and no loss 16% 
with loss 73% 
Theft in a dwelling 42% 
Theft from motor vehicles 
Theft of motor vehicles 
30% 
86% 
The Authors of the British Crime Survey (42) suggest that people make a 
form of 'cost-benefit' judgement and indicate that 'the main reason for 
not reporting_is the victims assessment that it is insufficiently 
serious to be grist for the mill of formal justic.e'. Crime reporting 
is, of co.urse, related to the insurance status of the victim.: Theft or 
damage is much less likely to get reported _if the victim is. uninsured 
and unlikely to gain by doing so. 
·Also, certain crimes are recorded in the particular areas where they 
occurred although they may not be linked to people in that street - this 
is particularly the case with car .crime. For example., Cl. -car recorded as 
stolen from outside, say, 100 Peel Street need not 'belong• to that 
address, it was simply parked there when stolen. 
Other policies also impinge on crime reporting rates. For instance, the 
repair bill for damaged windows and doors, is met by the Housing 
Association's insurers. Up until very recently the association required 
that such ·damage was reported to the Police, as a crime report number 
speeded the passage of the insurance claim. The effect of this would 
therefore be, presumably, to increase the overall reporting rate for 
such actions to a level higher than would normally be expected. In 
addition, the overall numbers of crimes (particularly in the surrounding 
areas for which we also have figures) are small, due to the small area 
of the estates concerned. Therefore it would be too dangerous to draw 
too many conclusions from the figures alone. 
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With regard to North Sherwood Street Estate the number of burglaries 
(with loss) is indeed quite high, both compa~ed to the neighbou~hood and 
also with ~he average foL the city as a whole which had a burglary rate 
of 1 in JS'dwellings (2.6%) in 1990, including both attempted and actual 
burglaries. Where detailed, access tended to be via windows (after 
breaking glass) or by breaking glass in doors to operate the lock and 
gain entry that way. The walk-in thefts and lawful acces.s thefts 
concern crime that happens when for example a door is left open and 
someone takes the opportunity to steal something (walk-in-theft) or when 
someo.ne who has the keys and the right of access (e.g. a .. partner or 
ex-partner)_ removes things without authority from the property (lawful 
access). The number of cases· of damage recorded can be.explained with 
reference to the Housing Assoc~ations insurance·claims policy mentioned 
above, and it is possible that a similar policy operates ·with.the 
Guinness Trust,. explaining their damage reporting ·rates. In most cases 
this concerns: damage to windows, often broken by stones, bricks, etc. 
In addition in 1990 there was one recorded case of arson (a firework 
through a letter box), one robbery involving the theft of .. a handbag and 
4 cases of assault (3 domestic, rather than in· the street)-within the 
boundaries of the estate. Taking into account the conditions concerning 
car cri~e mentioned above,. there were 2 cases of stolen vehicles, 5 
cases of attempted thefts of vehicles, 4 cases of theft from vehicles, 
and 3 cases of· .vehiCle damage. 
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On the private estate off North Sherwood Street (Matlock court, Clinton 
Court, Bluecoat Close and Bluecoat Street), the rate of burglaries {with 
loss) was much lower, although the. overall rate of both attempted and 
·successful burglaries (ll% of properties) was almost the same as North 
Sherwood Street estate (12% of properties). In addition, there was one 
robbery and:one rape in this acea. Vehicle crime included one case of 
damage, one theft and 5 thefts from vehicles. 
With regard to the Guinness Trust properties on Mansfield·Grove, Peel 
Street and Addison Street, (57 dwellings) , there were no recorded cases 
of burglary or attempted burglary in 1990. The three thefts included 
two benefit books and a bicycle. Recorded damage was again mainly to 
windows. car crime included one vehicle theft and two cases of damage. 
The terraced streets .(Clipstone Avenue, Birkland Avenue) did suffer from 
burglary but at a lower rate than either North Sherwood.Street or the 
private estate. Recorded car crime was also lower here with only one 
theft of a motor vehicle. One important comparison to make is the 
proportion of burglaries that involve theft as a proportion of those 
attempted or actually.carried out. On·North Sherwood SEreet Estate.83% 
were usuccessful". On the terraced.streets of the 5 .. 5% of properties 
that faced actual and attempted burglary 60% were "successful". 
However, on.the private 'mews' estate, where the rate for actual and 
.attempte~ burglary was 11% (almost as high as North Sherwood Street 
Estate). The "success" rate was only 38%. In several cases the police 
statistics showed tiiat potential burglars had been thwarted bTsuch 
measures as window locks. 
6.4.1 The Police view. 
The Police Crime Prevention Officers consulted felt that the estate was 
not particularly bad for crime compared to other estates4 However, they 
particularly noticed the weak points presented by the thumbturn door 
locks that provided an easy and unrestricted means of exit for the 
criminal and the weak points of entry~ notably the doors~ and bathroom 
windows on the two-storey blocks, making burglary, one. of the estate 
main problems, that much easier. 
They were well aware of the 1 0penness' o( the estate w.i·th _its many 
footpaths, that presented quick and easily ~scape routes. The use of 
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the estate as a through route also enabled opportunist criminals to 
become familiar with its layout without being challenged. 
Unrecognisable people were common users of the footpaths and therefore 
were allowed to pass unquestioned through the estate. As a large 
proportion of crime is opportunist, reducing the scope for such crime 
would seem an important objective. The Police Officers very strongly 
believed that reducing access to the estate would help reduce crime 
levels. 
6.5 Interviews 
6.5.1 Sampling. In view of the nature of the exercise and the time available 
it is inevitable that the selection of interviewees was random and the 
cross section of those interviewed does not reflect the estate profile 
in terms of age, sex, marital status or colour. The purpose was simply 
to obtain a rough indication of how different individuals perceived the 
problem of crime on their estate. A total of twenty people were 
interviewed on the basis of questions which were felt by the police 
officers to be relevant, and which, in the event, turned out to be 
remarkably consistent. 
The following tables categorise the respondents by gender, age group and 
length of time resident on the estate. 
Table 2 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
Table 3 
Age Group 
Young (15-25) 
Medium (26-50) 
Old (51-
Table 4 
Time 
0 - 3 
4 - 7 
8 - 11 
Respondents 
65% 
35% 
Respondents 
32% 
43% 
25% 
Respondents 
40% 
23% 
38% 
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6.5.2 Interview Responses 
Of the twenty residents who were interviewed almost three quarters felt 
that there was a problem with crime at North Sherwood Street. Of the 
remainder, only two thought otherwise, and four were uncertain. 
The main problems were considered to be:-
i) Vandalism, graffiti and damage to cars (40%). 
ii) Burglary (40%) 
iii) General noise, disturbance and offensive behaviour (20%). 
90% of those interviewed had personal experience of one or more of the 
crimes mentioned above during their period of residence. On being asked 
what measures they were personally prepared to take to protect their 
property, most felt that it was up to the Housing Association to take 
the initiative .. 
When asked who they felt were responsible for crime on the estate, 25% 
felt that other estate residents were involved, 50% that it was a 
mixture of residents and non-residents and the remainder were not 
prepared to say. 
Most residents interviewed felt that a more conspicuous and frequent 
police presence would have a deterrent effect, particularly in 
dispensing the groups of youths who tend to congregate in the public 
areas of the estate and create noise and disturbance~ Many respondents 
felt threatened by these gangs and the fear of crime is also a problem 
on this estate, particularly among the older residents~ 
6.6 Perceived weaknesses 
6.6.1 Access to Estate 
From a Crime Prevention point of view a point of legitimate access for 
law-abiding citizens is a potential means of escape for a criminal-
With fourteen different pedestrian routes into the complex, including 
three vehicle access points, the permutations of cross routes over the 
·estate are numerous and the whole principle of multiple access is 
directly contrary to the preferred crime prevention solution of a series 
of culs-de-sac without linking paths-
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Although potentially the most serious shortcoming in the planning of the 
estate, the possible remedy, i.e .. the closure and sealing off of some of 
the access points is not a feasible solution. The configuration of 
dwelling u~its is based upon the current road and footpath layout and to 
change one·without changing the other is not considered to be 
practicable by the author of this report. In addition, the social 
upheaval likely to be created by selective closure of site access points 
would be unacceptable to the residents. 
There are lessons to be learned, however, when planning new residential 
estates, but they cannot be retrospectively applied to .. existing 
developments. This serves to emphasise the importance of expert input 
from crime prevention specialists at initial planning stages of 
projects. 
6.6.2 Configuration of dwelling(Fig.3) 
Following on from consideration of road and footpath patterns, it was 
generally felt by the CPO's.that passive surveillance of the estate 
would have been better if those facing outwards from the perimeter of 
the estate could have been turned round. · they would then overlook the 
'inside_.' of the development making supervision of children and car parks 
much easier. 
One of the basic objectives in designing for crime prevention is to 
maximise passive surveillance. The theory, is that people going about 
their normal daily routines will observe and react to the·presence of 
strangers in 'their' immediate neighbourhood. Architects and planners 
are advised to plan their estates so that each.dwelling unit is 
overlooked by its neighbours. 
Needless to say this concept runs contrary to an individual's natural 
desire for privacy and, consequently, some will erect screens and plant 
hedges to prevent being overlooked. The balance between privacy and 
mutual surveillance is therefore not easy to achieve, especially in 
housing developments. 
The same principle can be applied to non-residential buildings more 
easily though its effectiveness under those conditions is much reduced 
due to most buildings being unoccupied out of working hours. 
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All agreed, however, that it would be worthwhile 'to examine' the extent 
to which some of the public space could be 'privatised', by 
re-allocating areas of public space, i.e. general landscaping and car 
parking to individual houseS:. This would also involve changes to the 
roads and Car parks which would be expensive and disruptive. The 
' .. 
configuration of the estate is such that desirable aims such as each 
house having its own garage or car parking space are impossible to 
superimpose on the existing layout. 
It may be possible to re-allocate some of the existing landscaped 
'public' space where dwellings are in juxtaposition with it . 
. · 
Another possibility identified by some of the officers was to relocate 
the estate management office from the edge of the estate to a more 
central position. This would assist in surveillance of· the p~blic areas 
during_working hours, and may have some deterrent effeCt. Damage .and 
vandalism might be identified and remedied more quickly if the site 
manager were in a more strategic location. 
During interviews, trouble spots were identified in the form of·ground· 
level utunnels", ·i.e. access through buildings at ground floor level 
with living accommodation above. These areas draw- the local youngsters 
like a ~agnet - they are a .shelter from rain, are not particularly 
visible from adjoi~~ng flats - and drug taking, graffiti and general 
disturbances result. Eliminating these areas would not be easy since 
they are an access route to the estate. The avoidance of similar 
features on new estates must be a priority item in any crime prevention 
design handbook. 
6.6.3 Maintenance of external areas 
Whilst the general 'ambience' of the estate was not generally 
detrimental, the CPO's felt that better and more frequent maintenance of 
the landscaped areas would achieve two aims. The first aim would be to 
eliminate potential ambush points and hiding places by cutting back 
over-grown shrubs and bushes. In some cases this could only be achieved 
by selective replanting. The secondary objective is t.? create, among 
residents, a greater proprietorial interest in the appear'ance of the 
estate as a whole. 
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A sense of •taking care of what is_ nice' could. it was felt, encourage 
better behaviour and less vandalism on the estate. The author does not 
support this Utopian view. Fcrty years experience of h~nding over new 
buildings in pristine condition only to see. them wrecked before tt.e 
subsequent final inspection may explain this. 
Nevertheless, there is clearly scope for improvement and any measure 
which improves the quality of life of the inhabitants must be beneficial 
to a degree though of doubtful value in a crime prevention sense. 
6.7 Recommendations 
6.7.1 Generally 
Because this exercise relates to an existing housing estate, any 
recommendations for improving the security must inevitably be realistic, 
capable of achievement, reasonably economical and potentially effective. 
The estate with all its imperfections from a_ crime prevention point of 
view is a pleasant area and was originally designed with skill and 
sensitiv~ty reflecting the philosophies in vogue at the time. In 1980, 
when this project was conceived. crime had not assumed the importance it 
has today, and the Science of crime prevention was in its infancy. 
Since then the nation has experienced a crime explosion and the issue 
has become a major factor in parliamentary debate. 
It is inevitable, therefore. that any recommendations for improvements 
to security will be, to an extent superficial in that they can be 
'applied' to an existing situation. They will consequently come under 
the heading of 'target hardening•. 
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6.7.2 Target Hardening 
It became clear from the tenants replies to the questions in 
interviews that residents felt that their security"ofl the estate would 
primarily be improved by 'target hardening' involving increased entry. 
•l .• ' 
controls to their flat or block_ ~his self-defence attitude rightly 
reflects their knowledge that there are obvious weak points in the 
design and security of the flats, but also reflects the fact that 
tenants rarely have the opportunity of giving their views and effecting 
changes to wider aspects of security such as the layout of the estate, 
street lighting and entrances~ 
It is important however, not to rely upon utarget hardening" as the 
predominant method. of improving security on the:est?te but to address 
estate layout and management issues as well. Behind mOre locked doors 
and entry phones, flats become yet more like privatised "fortresses~~. 
It is crucial that security remains a community issue and that street 
safety is addressed as well. Nevertheless, most burglary is 
opportunist, and can be deterred by .. modest cost target-hardenintj' 
measures which will quickly address the security weaknesses of the 
individual flats and the primary fears of many of the tenants. 
Summary Three storey blocks - 2 & 3 bed flats 
* 
* 
* 
Create more private space in the block by installing doors at 
the bottom of the stairs at the block entrance. 
Install an intercom access control system •entry phone• for each 
block. 
Replace the outer door to each flat with a stronger locking door 
with less glazing, but including a spy-hole and door-chain as 
standard. 
* Ensure that the lock to the outer door is more secure whilst still 
• 
complying with standards for fire escape. 
Heplacc the vulnerable glass side panel to the door with 
laminated glass or protect it: wi.t:h secondary glazing. 
83. 
* Install window restrictors to all opening windows in the ground 
floor flats. 
~o Storey·Blocks- 2 & 2 bed flats 
* Replace the front door to each flat with a stronger locking door 
with less glazing, but including a spy-hole and door-chain as 
standard. Where it is on the lock of the door, replace the glazed 
side panel with a strong plywood panel. 
* Ensure- that the lock to the front door is replaced by a more secure 
lock, whilst still complying with fire exit standards. 
* Fit window restrictors to all bathroom windows to stop this being 
an easy access-point for break-ins. 
* 
* 
Fit window restrictors to all. windows in the ground floor flats. 
Install a suitable locking bolt to the. French windows where these 
occur. Consider installing decorative iron grilles to the lower 
glass pane in the door and side panel. 
All Flats 
* Install a smoke alarm in each flat. This is now a common and 
standard safety measure in ne1;v properties·. 
6.7.3 Lighting 
* A regular check needs to be kept on the tirneswitch for the lights 
to the staircases in the three-storey block. At best, it needs 
locking in a separate cupboard, to prevent it being tampered \>1ith 
by children or tenants. Currently they have access to the whole 
meter cupboard. 
It is recommended that t.he estate lighting in the following 
locations needs attention~ and could be improved by the means 
described: 
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* Installation of a freestanding lamp near North Sherwood Street to 
serve the footpath by 19-29 North Sherwood Street. 
* A gable-mounted lamp is desirable for the footpath by 36-37 
Dundas Close (if the footpath remains open). 
* A wall mounted lamp on 48-58 Dryden Street to light .the dark 
passage by 44-46 Dryden Street. 
* Free-standing lamps to serve the access ways to th~. two storey 
blocks along 48-58 Peel Street, 77-87 North Sherwood Street and 
8-16 Alma Close. 
* The dog-leg. path by 30-31 Dundas Close is very shadowy, -an extra 
lamp may help here although selective replanting of the tall bushes 
which currently obscure the street lighting may be sufficient . 
. t If a block door is added to the three-storey blocks then an 
external light is required to light the entry phone panel, the 
keyhole and the entrance generally. 
* Using existing lamp standards~ white light halogen security 
lamps should be added to each car park. 
6.8 Conclusions 
To the author the whole exercise was both helpful and encouraging. The 
crime prevention officers were hi9hly professional, dedicated, and, even 
though for them the operation was academic they approached it with a 
high level of enthusiasm. To the extent that they were dealing with a 
'fait accompli' i.e. an existing estate their analysis of the weaknesses 
and their recommendations for improvement were concentrated and 
perceptive. 
Hhat the exercise could not show is the extent to which the officers 
could identify weaknesses in a scheme still only at pl~nning stage. It 
is much more difficult to pinpoint problems where they have not yet been 
built, i.e. on a sm<J.ll scale site layout plan. 
Nevertheless, the results of tl1cir survey and the list of 
recommendations produced indicate that action is still possible even 
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though the basic design could not. be changed. 
What is significant for the author of this report is th~t changes in 
design at~drawing board stage could have resulted in substantial 
improvements to security. The basic presumption that it is possible to 
'design out' crime has not been and cannot be conclusively proved, but 
there is no doubt in the minds of the crime prevention officers from 
West Midlands Forces~ Their day to day experience of criminal activity 
and its aftermath qualifies them uniquely to support such a presumption. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DESIGNING FOR SECURITY 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 
Chapter ? 
DESIGNING FOR SECURITY 
7.1 Influences on design 
Throughout the history of building design~ the architect. in 
addition to providing suitable accommodation for specific 
functions. has been required to address other external 
factors. He has been conscious of those external influences 
on buildings which could be expected to occur during the 
lifetime of the building and which he must make the 
construction capable of .withStanding. These influences are:-
1. Weather 
2. Geology 
3. Materials 
4.. In use 
rain 
snow 
frost 
wind 
sun 
Ground movement 
subsidence 
natural deterioration 
wear and tear 
In addition. it now appears that criminal attack should be 
added·to the list~ although a building may never, during a. 
normal life-cycle be subjected to it. The various forms of 
risk are: 
fire 
burglary 
terrorism 
vandalism 
Lam raiding 
arson 
7.2 Risk Assessment 
The assessment of the risk of any building being subjected 
to any oL all of the above forms of attack will normally be 
carried out by the building ownec, with advice from his 
insurers and the local c~ime prevention officer. The 
specific risks to be taken into account by the archi.tect 
will form part of the design brief. 
The arcl1itect designing a building is attempting to create 
appropriate functional spaces suitable for the purpose for-
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which the space is designated within limits of time and cost. 
In addition he must address the three dimensional nature of 
building design in his efforts to create visual harmony~ 
appropriateness of expression, scale, proportion~ rhythm, 
texture 'and· colour. The spaces so created must be of the 
necessary size and shape and have the correct relationship with 
other spaces. 
It will be appreciated, therefoce, that the final form of the 
project, as built~ will represent a balance between the ideal 
and the possible, and a reconciliation of the client's dreams 
and the realities of cost, time and the skill of the architect. 
If the need for security measures to be included at design 
stage is stated during the initial briefing discussions 
between the client and the architect, and expert guidance on 
specific measures is obtained, the design will not be 
compromised unduly. The architect will feed information and 
advice on security planning and techniques into the design 
process in exactly the same way as he considers problems of 
drainage~ fire safety. 
7.3 Specia1ist Advice 
It is, however, vital that specialist advice is sought from 
the local police at project briefing stage~ before any 
design work commences. Crime prevention techniques are 
fundamental and can affect the shape of the building~ the 
configuration of external walls~ roof~ openings, and 
even the location of the building on the site. 
In addressing crime prevention at design stage, the 
architect can be assisted by input from the police crime 
prevention service who will. on request 
a) Provide information on site selection by means of a 
"Crime Profile" when the location of a new building is 
being considered. This will provide information·· on 
the incidence and type of crime experienced in the area. 
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b) Provide advice at briefing stage on all aspects of crime 
prevention. including an analysis of risk specific to 
building type. 
c) Provide a security report of a check carried out on basis 
of drChltects preliminary drawings. 
d) Advice specifically on selection of appropriate types of 
locks, alarm, fence, etc. 
Design guidance in a form easily understood by architects is 
extremely useful and the method of presentation found by .the 
author to be helpful is a checklist. Such lists are n~ver 
exhaustive but can be adapted and updated in use by the 
desi9ner as he or she becomes more familiar with the subject. 
The lists set out in Appendix 2 are adapted from information 
issued by the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit to police crime 
prevention officers - or. in some cases ~architectural 
liaison officers• - to gui9e them in advising architects on· 
security. 
7.4 Principles of Security Design_ 
7.4.1 Siting and Configuration of· Buildings 
There is much that can be done at the stage in the design 
process which concentrates on estate layout.~ whether residential 
or commercial and industrial. The relationship between one 
building and its neighbours. and between groups of buildings 
and the road and footpath pattern can either_ generate or 
reduce crime (18). Over provision of pedestrian routes can 
provide easy means of escape for burglars and through 
vehicular access reduces the scope for casual surveillance~ 
The "Secured by Design" initiative {Chapter 5) reconunends 
the use of "culs de sac" where possible on housing estates 
to enable residents to detect the presence of strangers in 
their pacticulaL- cul de sac more easily_ It goes orl to 
recommend that the numbci:" of pedestcian links between culs-
de-sac be kept to a minimw11 and thot all pedestrian coutes. 
can be overLooked. 
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7.4.2 Car Parking (residentia1) 
It is adviseable to provide car parking within the curtilage 
·-·~. of each property. or at least in a location where the owner 
"=an see .ft from his house. Parking courts or gara9~ park,ing 
7.4.3 
7.4.5 
.. 
should be avoided (18). 
Pub1ic and Private Space 
Site layout should define 'public' space and 'private' 
space by real or symbolic barriers. Real barriers include 
fences, walls, gates, hedges, planting and railings and 
symbolic barriers include changes of hard paving surfaces, 
speed ramps, dwarf walls, reduction in paving widths, gate 
piers with no gates and bollards. 
In the case of public buildings, the bUilding should be 
designed for pedestrian access from the front with separate 
vehicle access to car parking~ Pedestrian routes from car 
parts to building entrance should be clearly marked and 
unobstructed~ 
Car Parking. ( conuuercial. areas ) 
Some parking provision should be made adjacent to the main 
entrance to enable staff entering or leaving the building out 
of hours to reach their vehicle quickly~ Surface car·parks 
should be _capable of being overlooked and pedestrian and 
vehicle routes segregated and clearly signed~ In the case 
of enclosed car parks, structural columns sh~uld be limited 
in number. and. where possible. direct access at each level 
to the associated office block or shop should be. provided. 
Landscaping (soft) 
Planting is an important component of building design and 
site layout. but where used arbitrarily can provide concealment 
foe potential intrudecs. It is essential to consider cacefully 
the selection of plant types and the dispostion of trees and 
shrubs and to cns_ur.c that coL""rect and fr:-equcnt maintenance is 
provided. Thocny plants are useful in dctecring people from 
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taking short cuts~ The landscaping, both hard and soft, should 
be considered as an integral part .of the original design and not 
something to be applied to the completed scheme. 
External ba~riers are important and should be used to define 
"private" areas such as rear gardens or secure compounds attached 
to commercial premises. They have a visual impact and should be 
designed sensitively. They do, however, attract the attention 
of vandals with aerosols, and, where appropriate, should be 
constructed with materials which can easily be cleaned. In 
some cases, the opportunity for graffiti artists can be 
reduced by planting. 
Tne Bui1ding Sbape 
Crime prevention officers haVe identified a correlation between 
building= shape.. and crime. Examinations of buildings affected· 
by _crime have tended to indicate that_ the more compact it ·is. 
the lower the risk of criminal attack.. Buildings which •sprawl* 
across the site, with many perimeter indentations provide 
hiding, places for the ambush of pedestrians·. or allow burglars 
to work unseen and uninterrupted. Open plan industrial 
estates, 1960's and 1970's single storey schools and many 
housing estates have been found by the police to suffer 
.disproportionately in this respect.: As an architect responsible 
for the design of many school buildings du~ing the period 
quoted* the author is well aware of the philosophy which 
determined the design of the primary schools of that period. 
Education experts, psychologists and architects were convinced 
that primary schools should be light. airy. inviting places, 
with easy access to enclosed or partially enclosed outside 
teaching areas. Hence the informal~ attenuated plan shapes 
which~ a generation latec~ are contributing to the crime rate. 
The othet" extr-eme solution. i.e. the 'fortress' concept has 
been identified by research carried out by cciminolo<j .. ists as 
likely to attract CI."iminal attention as an obviously well 
defended building is seen by some cciminals as a challenge. 
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Fig.4 - Secure housing layout 
7.4.8 
Nevertheless. the elimination of unnecessary indentations 
or protrusions along the perimeter of a building is recommended. 
and, in most cases the author believes that the overall design 
need not be compromised. 
The juxtaposition. of flat roofs with upper floor windows or 
rooflights is also best avoided. Any ground floor feature which 
acts as a platform for entering the building at a higher.· level 
is a potential weakness. 
The position of windows on each elevation should. wher~. 
possible. be organised so as to give a clear view of the 
building surroundings. approach roads and footpaths, car parks and 
loading areas. 
Construction of the Bui1ding Enve1ope (Fig.S) 
·, 
The factors which determine the choice of constructional 
technique are_ varied. and in some cases. contradictory~ Retail 
outlets. for example. require their main facade to be a showcase 
for their products~ Banks and office buildings do not~ The 
need for maximum security often conflicts with quick escape in 
the event of fire (19). The use of external grilles over display 
windows. or roller .. shutters_ over shop fronts is often not 
permitted by the planning authority on aesthetic grounds. The 
architect must attempt to reconcile these conflicts in a 
building which satisfies the functional requirements. is. 
aesthetically pleasing. has structural integrity and is built 
within imposed limits of time and cost. 
It is inevitable that compromises must be made. but the 
architect must be able to include~ within the constructioni 
counter measur-es against crime which are appropriate to the 
peccieved risk. These will include an outer defensive system. 
such as heavy bollardsi against ram-raiding. i.e. the use of a 
vehicle to smash the wall of the building to gain rapid entry. 
It is important that doors and frames are equally str_ong. 
Thccc is no point in fitting a sophisticated lock to a cheap 
and flimsy door:-. 
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Glazing is vitally impo~tant and the selection of glass types 
needs great care {32)~ What is·effective for security may not 
be acceptable for fire resistance. 
Roof coverings are one of the first lines of defence against 
unlawful entry and need careful consideration. Pitched roofs 
with tiles or slates are particularly vulnerable as are flat 
roofs consisting of lightweight deck and covering. Concrete 
deck flat roofs are much more secure. 
Services. e.g. electricity. telephones should be concealed, 
particularly where entering the building to avoid being 
disabled by potential intruders. 
Ironmongery and Door and Window Fastenings 
This subject· is covered comprehensively in handbooks on 
security, manufacturer's catalogues, design guides~ B.S.I. 
Guides (17), Home Office publications (28). As part of the' 
biSic design process it can be classed as an "add-on" means of 
protection in the same way as intruder alarms.. That is to. say 
that whilst security· hardware is. ·vitally necessary it will 
not be accorded much space in a study concerned with more 
fundamental concepts. The important thing is that doors, 
windows and security hardware are considered as one element 
and interact accordingly in the finished building. 
Security Alarm Systems 
A properly designed intruder detection syste~ is one component 
of a fully considered design for a secure building. To the 
extent that such a system can be "applied" to a buiiding at 
any stage, up to and after completion. it does not materially 
affect the design process. Such measures, therefore. have 
not been included in this research project. 
Lighting 
Lighting can be used in two main ways. During the hours of 
darkness, pcrmane_nt or autorn.atica lly activated lighting can 
extend the period of natural surveillance of the pLoperty to 
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cover. the full 24 hours. In addition, selected internal lights 
can be activated by photo-electric cell or timeswitch to 
give the impression that the premises are occupied. 
On residehtial estates~ shopping aceas~ car parks and oth~r 
areas used by pedestrians, a high level of illumination is vita1. 
Light sources should be placed "so as to avoid casting dark 
shadows over areas frequented by predestrians. 
All lighting needs frequent and correct maintenance, and should, 
where possible be vandal proof, and fixed at a height at which 
is cannot be easily damaged or interfered with. Vandal proof light 
fittings are essential in residential areas. 
7.5 CONCLUSIONS 
·-
While acknowledging the impo~tance of aesthetic qualities 
of a building, it must be pointed out that a design which takes 
account of the security implications can be attractive. The 
two factors are compatible - a vandalised building loses out on 
both counts. 
Once a building has been constructed~ the best chance to "design 
out" crime will have gone. Implementation of police/ 
architect liaison, will prove to be an achievement for all 
concerned, a positive benefit to the community and a major 
contribution to the prevention of crime. 
Nevertheless it cannot be stressed too emphatically that this study 
has led the author to conclude that recommendations alone are 
insufficient4 Harrington-Lynn (12) recommends that consideration 
should be given to the inclusion in the Building Regulations of 
requirements for security measur-es in dwellings. 
His study concluded that direct and indicect health risks to the 
population resulting frotn exposur-e to arson, burglary and criminal 
damage ace of comparable magnitude to the risks to h.ealth and 
safety acising from items curccntly falling within the remit of 
the Building Regulations and the Fitness Standar-d4 
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Until crime prevention is supported by the power of the law 
which requires the checking of all proposed building developments 
by a compe~ent authority at design stage, progress towards the 
preventiQn of crime by design will be unacceptably slow. 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 The Begirinings of Designing Out Crime 
Crime prevention through building design. as a concept. is 
not new. Throughout the ages mankind has sought to protect 
himself. his family and his property from criminal attaCk~ 
which, in many cases. accompanied the occupation of territory 
by a victorious opponent. Burning. raping, pillaging were not 
part of the conflict but a direct result of it, .and man·· soon 
learned to erect protective structures. form ramparts and 
excavate trenches or moats to deter or delay potential 
opponents and give the occupants more time to prepare more 
active methods of defence~ 
There are, of ·course, differences between organised war for 
political reasons and burglary by individuals. but the principles 
of defending. ones property are the same. 
8 .. 2 The Influence of the Designed Environment 
' Crewe (27) is a strong advocate of the ability of architects to 
manipulate space to influence human behavior. His views are 
supported by Newman (2) and Poyner (l) who refers to mediaeval 
castles and Baron Haussman•s design for Paris in the mid nineteenth 
century. It is known that personal feelings can be affected by the 
immediate environment and mood changed by the· sc~le·of the 
building_ ·spiritual awareness can be generated 
by the lofty proportions of a mediaeval cathedral and scale~ 
texture~ colour. light and noise are all known by psychologists 
profoundly to influence human behavior. Such influences are often 
sub-conscious but also can be obvious and will produce an 
immediate response from the observer:. A well protected building 
will send visual messages to a would be burglar to re-consider 
his original intention to tacget such a building. Similacly an 
open ground floor window in a secluded, apparently unoccupied 
house is an invitation. Ccime prevention through environmental 
design, in its cu.crcnt state. is simply part of a gradual, 
96-
evolutionary process towards more sophisticated and effective 
method of making burglary so unattractive that it will not be 
attempted. If this seems to represent a Utopian view. the increase 
in armed robbery at post offices. banks and building societies 
results. 
1
, • ih the author 1 s opinion, partly from the futility of 1 out 
of hours' attempts to break into the buildings. Ram raiding, or the 
use of a four-wheel-drive vehicle to smash its way thro~gh a Shop 
front is a reaction to the use of measures which make "normal" 
methods of entry more time-consuming and difficult. 
8.3 can Crime be ""Designed Out•? 
The results of this study indic?te that 
there is no doubt that buildings can be made inherently more 
secure at the design stage. The whole strategy of official 
crime prevention initiatives is based ~pan such a premise, and 
all crime prevention special~ists· in"terviewed were wholeheartedly 
in favour of it. 
Tha:t the level of enthusi·asm among the ordinary members of 
the public interviewed was considerably lower is to be expected, 
although one would have expected those who had been burgled"to 
take a·· more positive view. In· the event. they appeared to be 
resigne~ to the inevitable further attack bn· their property. (V3) 
Reaction from the corporate sector was predictable. The scale 
of losses from burglary paled into insignificance compared with 
losses from shoplifting. pilfering by staff. fraud and other 
ingenious methods used by employees to transfer the ownership 
of items from their employers to themselves. Whilst aware 
of the need to take what they perceived to be "normal 
precautions" against unauthorised entry. they felt that further 
measures would not be cost-effective~ 
Amongst the architects there was little doubt that crime could 
be .. designed out" to a greateror lesser degree, and that such 
a concept was desirable in pt:-actice. There was much debate on the 
effectiveness of tl1e principles related to building type and 
magnitude of risk. for example. it was considered absurd to attempt 
to design building~ generally to resist terrorist attack or effects 
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of explosions at close quarters. Arson was also felt to be 
difficult to counter since, whilst buildings themselves are required 
·to be fire resistant, there is no control over flanunability of many Of 
the contents. The important objective is to ensure adequate 
means of .escape for t!1e occupants. 
Some potential difficulty occurs when the external appearance of 
buildings is altered by security grilles and shutters~ especially in 
conservation areas of towns or where planning controls are more 
stringent. In Nottingham recently the planning authority have issued 
a notice to a store to remove an external shutter because it is 
aesthetically unacceptable. This in spite of the store having had 
its shop front smashed seven times in the preceding twelve months. 
Grilles and shutters are in common use on the continent where .the 
quality of the architecture is often better, .althou~h. s}?.op fronts 
there are often smaller and the shutters less intrusive. 
Scope of designing out crime by buildi~g function 
a) Housing - MUch can be dOne at initial planning stage in terms of 
layout. defensible space, passive surveillance and target 
hardening. 
b) Schools- Poyner·(l} identifies research which clearly shows 
tliat post-war schools on large open campus sites are particularly 
vulne·rable. fheir light and relatively·" flimsy" construction 
and articUlated perimeter shape increase their vulnerability and. 
make applied protection more difficu~t and expensive. Pre-war 
buildings usually on enclosed urban sites, with traditional 
construction and smaller windows have been found to be less 
prone to attack. The idealism of the 1950's and 1960's which 
encouraged architects to provide large eXpanses of glazing, 
informal shapes. easy integration of interior and exterior 
spaces has become the curse of the 1990's. Educational idealogies 
will need to be re-considered to enable new school buildings to 
be more secure. 
c) Retail, Commercial and Leisure- These building types are 
especially difficult to design with crime prevention in mind 
since their very purpose involves their being open to the general 
public. In the case of retail premises. goods are often displayed 
outside the Shop entrance to encourage people to go in. 
Protection through building design must be secondary in these 
cases and technology takes over in the form of electronic 
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surveillance. tagging of goods. security staff. warning notices 
and chaining of display goods to secure points attached to 
the building fabric. 
MeasU:res· which can be incorporated at planning stage are limited 
to protecting the building from external attack when the premises 
are closed, and attempting to achieve the following:-
1) Improving lines of sight to making display cabinets and 
.supermarket gondolas partly .. see through". 
2} Removing poorly-supervised corners and recesse~,· 
3) Attempting to reduce crowding, particularly in queues and 
round the computer display area by increasing spacing between 
displays and installing queue barriers. 
4) Concentrating key target areas into one higher security 
zone. 
The Future 
Further Research 
The fight against crime must keep pace with the increasingly 
·-
sophisticated activities of criminals and much needs to be done to 
co-ordinate and direct the fragmented efforts Oeing made by a 
large number of agencies. Much work is being done. but a structured 
framework of research studies. evaluation and guidance to designers 
is vitally necessary~ 
Education and Training 
The author can identify only one school of architecture. out of a 
total of twenty four. which attempts to instruct its undergraduate 
architects in the subject of crime prevention by design. 
Training of crime prevention officers appears to be well organised 
but does not lead to a degr:-ee or- similar qualification which would 
accord professional status to its graduates. 
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Much needs to be done in the field of educating those whose 
efforts can make a big contribut.ion towards increasing building 
security. 
Only an architect's training gives him the skill to design a 
secur~·building without making it look like a fortress-
Legislation 
Gatepain (35) argues that the current syst.em of architectural 
liaison between police crime prevention and architects is a waste 
of police resources- The time of properly qualified officers is 
better employed at the cutting edge of crime investigations and 
prevention. Attempting, by persuasion alone, to educate design 
professionals in securi~y when invited to do so is unlikely to 
achieve the desired aim. 
Throughout California, USA, all building designs and development 
plans must be inspected with a view to checking on security 
measures in relation to the crime patterns in the location where 
the building is to be con~'tructed~ This inspection is carried 
out by suitably qualified officials within the local authority on 
the basis of codes of practice setting out mandatory security 
mea-sures-
The author is convinced that the introduction of such a system in 
the U.K. would be simple and effective. The vehicle already 
exists in the form of the Building Regulations, and the 
inspectors in the form of Building Control Officers. The system 
appears to work well in fire prevention, why not with crime 
prevention too? Moves are being made in this direction by the 
P-S-A- and Building Research Establishment but no conclusions 
appear to have been reached. 
Nevertheless it must be conceded that there are aspects of crime 
prevention at design stage that would be difficult to bring 
within the legislative process~ To impose strict control over 
building shape form and configuration would inhibit designers to 
an unacceptable degree and prevent their skills being exercised 
for the benefit of their client. 
Some building types, notably primary schools, residential care 
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homes, nurseries, homes for the mentally and physically 
handicapped and community hospitals should not be planned within 
a geometric straitjacket~ Such buildings are usually single 
storeyi and need to be arranged in an articulated manner to 
achieVe domestic scale and a close relationship with sheltered 
external spaces-
The configuration of these functional types will inevitably be 
loose, possibly with units of accommodation linked by glazed 
corridors in an informal manner, thereby creating indentations 
and projections which could provide concealment for the burglar~ 
Similarly in multi-unit residential development a balance must be 
struck between the individual's natural desire for privacy, and 
the mutual protection afforded, by being overlooked by 
neighbouring dwellings~ The feeling of living in a "goldfish 
bowl" is not acceptable to many people who may prefer to accept 
the greater risk of being burgled rather than live in public 
view. 
Principles of designing out crime which could be brought under 
sta~utory control fall within the general headings of:-
a) Residential estate layout 
b) Target hardening 
In spite of these difficulties, the author is convinced that the 
perceived fear of crime among the more vulnerable sections of the 
community is a threat to health in much the same way as that 
generated by inadequate ventilation or poor sanitation, and 
should therefore be taken seriously~ 
The procedure for codifying crime prevention measures into 
statutory legislation could be as follows:-
1. The Building Research Establishment (BRE) produces draft 
proposals for discussion-
2~ Proposals discussed by representatives of building 
professionals, crime prevent.ion specialists the construction 
industry, the National House Building Council and the 
Department of the Environment~ 
101-
8.4.5 
8.5 
3~ BRE considers outcome of discussions and prepares a 
document setting out conclusions and recommendations, for 
inclusion in Fit.ness Standard and Building Regulations~ 
4~ Regulations ratifi~9. and given statutorY ·-aUthority by 
Her Majesty's Government. 
Initially, the author would expect the new regulations to cover 
residential buildings only, since further research is necessary 
to ascertain the extent to which non-residential buildings could 
be similarly regulated. 
To enshrine crime prevention measures within the law is an 
emotive subject and could not succeed without the full 
co-operation of the design professions~ The official view of the 
Royal Institute of British Architects is that the fear of crime 
is greater than statistics can justify and· that protective 
devices such as security grilles increase the ambience of fear 
and promote sterile design (39) . Design rules can only be 
·effective if designers have been involved in their formulation 
and that security techniques must be sympathetic to the quality 
of the environment in which they are installed~ 
The author concludes from this study that an individual building 
can be made more secure if, at design stage, the architect is 
aware of, and incorporates into his design measures appropriate 
to the function of the building and the perceived risk of attack. 
Nevertheless, this research identifies much that needs to be done 
if crime prevention at design stage is to-be an automatic process 
equivalent to thermal efficiency or good drainage4 
Chapter 3 has identified a wide range of knowledge but relatively 
little information set out in a form useful to designers-
The discussions described in Chapter 4 reveal much interest in 
the subject of crime prevention by design, but relatively little 
enthusiasm, even among architects, for what they Perceive as 
further erosion of "aesthetic freedom". Building owners require 
to be convinced of the cost benefit of .incorporating crime 
prevention measures in their buildings. 
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The author is encouraged by the variety of initiatives referred to 
in Chapter 5, but remains convinced of the need for this disparate 
efforts to be brought under a single co-ordinating agency such as 
the Home.Office. 
The results of the Case Study (Chapter 6) have persuaded the author 
that the objectives of this study have been met and that much can 
be done at design stage to reduce crime, and the fear of crime on 
housing estates~ The rising incidence of crime is a problem for 
politicians, psychologists, sociologists and others, but we all 
must play our own part in fighting it. 
103. 
.. 
CHAPTER 9 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Chapter 9 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Poyner, Bar!Y 
Newrnan, Oscar 
Coleman, Alice 
Pascoe, Tiro 
Sinnott, Ralph 
Dennis P~ Rosenbaurn 
Jeffery,C Ray 
Heal,· Kevin & 
Laycock, Gloria 
Ekblom, Paul 
Hamilton, J P S 
Home Office Crime 
Prevention Centre 
Harrington - Lynn 
John 
" " 
Underwood G and 
Shaw M R 
Collishaw, David 
& Severn John 
States of Jersey 
Crime Prevention Panel 
British Standards 
Institution 
Design Against Crime - Beyond Defensible 
Space - London, Butterworths 1983. 
Defensible Space - People and Design in the 
Violent City - New York Macmillan 
London, The Architectural Press 1973. 
Utopia on Trial- London,Hilary Shipman 1986. 
M~Sc Thesis - Secured by Design -
A Crime Prevention Philosophy 
Cranfield Institute of Technology 1992. 
Safety and Security in Building Design -
London - Blackwell Scientific Publications 
1985. 
Community Crime Prevention - Does it Work? 
London, HMSO 1988. 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design 
- Sage Publications, Beverley Hills, 1971 
Situational Crime Prevention - From Theory 
into Practice - London, HMSO 1986. 
The Prevention of Shop Theft - London 
Home Office Crime Prevention Unit 1986. 
Security is an-Attitude- London, 
Chubb & Son Ltd., 1981. 
Police Architectural liaison Manual of 
Guidance - Stafford, Home Office Crime 
Prevention Centre, 1987. 
Building Regulations and Security - a Review 
- Watford, Building Research Establishment 
1993 
The BRE Watford Burglary Study - Watford 
Building Research Establishment 1991. 
Building Design for Security - International 
Trends and Activities - Watford, Building 
Research Establishment 1988. 
Crime Prevention of Building Design -
Nottinghamshire Constabulary 1989. 
Design Against Crime - States of Jersey 
Police Authority 1990. 
B S guidP. for Security of Buildings against 
Crime, Parts l-3 - London, Brit.ish Standards 
Institution, 1986 - 1990 
104. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
Leicestershire County 
Council 
Home Office Fire 
Department 
Nee, c 
Clarke, R V B 
Cornish D B 
Home Office 
Research Study 131 
Department of the 
Environment 
-- -... 
Elliott C L, Mays 
G C; Smith P D 
Clarke, R V G & 
Mayhew, P 
Shapland, Joanna 
& Vagg, John 
Crewe, Timothy D 
Home Office 
Darbyshire, Neil 
Spencer, c 
O'Leary, c 
Monsanto Chemicals 
Ltd 
Jones, Robert 
Lucas, Daniel 
Hillier, B & 
Penn, A 
and 
Crime Prevention by Planning and Design -
Leicestershire County Council 1988. 
Report on the Fire at Woolworth's 
Manchester on 8th May 1979 - London, 
Home Office, 1980. 
Residential Burglary in the Republic of 
Ireland : A Situational Approach -
Unpublished Ph.D Thesis University College, 
Cork, 1990. 
Crime Control in Britain - A Review of 
Policy Research - London, Home Office 1986 
Housing, Community and Crime - London, 
Home Office, 1993 
Crime Prevention on Housing Estates -
London, HMSO 1993. 
The Protection of Buildings against 
Terrorism and Disorder - London, Institution 
of Civil Engineers 1992. 
Designing out Crime 
London, HMSO 1980, 
Policing by the Public 
London, Routledge, 1988. 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design 
New York, Butterworth - Heinernann, 1991~ 
Practical Ways to Crack Crime 
London, Home Office 199L 
Middle Classes Under Siege 
Daily Telegraph October 23, 1993. 
Crime- The Observer February 17, 1991. 
Household Insurance - Daily Telegraph 
December 11, 1993. 
The Secret Strength of Laminated Glass 
Trade Technical Handbook 
Report of Investigation carried out by 
Nottingham University into the scope for 
improvements to a Nottingham Housing Estate 
Unpublished survey by Nottingham University 
1992 
""' "The Mozart Estate Redesign Proposal" 
Communities - Crime Reduction 
London, HMSO 1988 
105. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
Gatepain, R J 
McCracken, Grant 
Weisberg, Herbert F 
Bowen, Bruce D 
Eastham, R K 
Home Office 
York Institute of 
Architectural Studies 
"Crime Concern" 
Teymur, Markus & 
Woolley 
Security - Regulations & Housebuilding -
Architect & Surveyor London June.1990. 
The Long Interview - London, Sage 
Publications, 1988. 
Survey Research and Data Analysis 
San Francisco, Scott Foreman 1989 
R I B A Journal May 1994 
Editorial comment (pp. 12-13) 
Circular 44/1990 
Video - .. Safe as Houses'' - York, IAAS, 1989 
Publicity Brochure, 1993, issued by 
Crime Concern, Lqndon, 1989 
Rehumanising Housi~g - London, Butterworths, 
1988 
106. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Acknowledgements 
I am indebted to many people without whose patient assistance 
and encouragement this study would not have been attempted~ 
In addition·~o all those who agreed to subject themselves to 
interviews. my especial thanks are due to Richard Neale and 
William Sher. my long suffering tutors. Their help and. 
understanding, together with some persuasion at times. have 
been invaluable in ensuring the completion of the work. For his 
introduction of the North Sherwood Estate my thanks are also due 
to Alistair Gardner., Senior Lecturer at the Nottingham University 
School of Architecture. 
107. 
Appendix 1 
West Sussex Police Authority 
Crime Statistics 
Appendix 1 
Statistics produced by permission of the West Sussex Police Authority 
INCREASE IN BURGLARIES 
% growth in the number of offences 
between 1981 and 1991 
Leicestershire 
Lincolnshire 
Devon and Cornwall 
Staffordshire 
Gloucestershire 
Norfolk 
Kent 
Avon and Somerset 
Cumbfia 
Dyfed-Powys 
Thames Valley 
Bedfordshire 
City of London 
South Yorkshire 
Northamptonshire 
SUssex 
Essex 
West Yorkshire 
Suffolk 
Wiltshire 
Cambridgeshire 
Durham 
Cleveland 
Dorset 
Hertfordshire 
Surrey 
Humberside 
Lancashire 
Gwent 
Northumbria 
Warwickshire 
Greater Manchester 
West Mercia 
Cheshire 
Hampshire 
Derbyshire 
Nottinghamshire 
North Yorkshire 
West Midlands 
·. 
Metropolitan Police District 
South Wales 
North V!a les 
Merseyside 
Total (England and Wales) 
TABLE l 
252 
197 
182 
176 
174 
169 
163 
157 
148 
145 
144 
140 
135 
130 
124 
120 
118 
116 
115 
115 
106 
106 
104 
99 
99 
94 
92 
91 
90 
89 
87 
85 
81 
79 
77 
64 
62 
59 
50 
47 
41 
27 
-8 
79 
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BURGLARY CLEAR-UP RATE 
% of burglaries cleared up by Police 
Cleveland 
Merseyside 
Lancashire 
Dorset 
Lincolnshire 
Greater Manchester 
Staffordshire 
Dyfed-Powys 
Norfolk 
Gwent 
Northamptonshire 
Northumbria 
North Wales 
West Midlands 
Cheshire 
Humberside 
South Yorkshire 
Cumbria 
Cambridgeshire 
Essex 
West Mercia 
Durham 
Warwickshire 
Derbyshire 
Gloucestershi-re 
Leicestershire 
South Wales 
Hampshire 
West Yorkshire 
Wiltshire 
Hertfordshire 
Nottinghamshire 
Suffolk 
Devon and Cornwall 
North Yorkshire 
Bedfordshire 
City of London 
Surrey 
Thames Valley 
Kent 
Avon and Somerset 
Sussex 
Metropolitan Police District 
Total (England and Wales) 
TABLE 2 
1991 (81) 
43 (36) 
42 (34) 
39 (36) 
36 (24) 
36 (43) 
35 (26 j 
35 (38) 
35 (49) 
34 ( 31) 
34 ( 31) 
33 (30) 
33 (42) 
3 3 ( 45) 
31 (27) 
30 (39) 
30 (29) 
30 ( 46) 
29 ( 34) 
28 (40) 
28 (32) 
27 ( 36) 
23 ( 36) 
23 ( 36) 
22 (36) 
22 (32) 
22 (44) 
22 (50) 
21 (23) 
21 ( 41) 
21 (27) 
20 (30) 
20 (58) 
20 ( 35) 
17 (27) 
17 (31) 
14 (38) 
14 (19) 
14 ( 18) 
14 (29) 
13 (27) 
12 ( 32) 
11 (32) 
10 ( 7) 
24 (28) 
109. 
Appendix 1 (Cent 'd) 
BURGLARY OFFENCES 
% 
' DIVISION SUB-DIVISION OFFE!ICES DETECTED DETECTED 
WE:ST CHICHESTER Wl 828 207 25.0 
ARUN W2 1176 154 13.1 
WORTHING W3 985 86 8.7 
SHOREHAM W4 540 61 11.3 
TOTAL 3529 508 14.4 
NORTH CRAWLEY Nl 779 60 7.7 
HORS HAM N2 659 58 8.8 
MID-SUSSEX N3 570 52 9.1 
EAST GRINSTEAD N4 700 51 7.3 
TOTAL 2708 221 8.1 
GATWICK GATWICK G1 16 
TOTAL 16 
CENTRAL BRIGHTON Cl 2647 . 357 l3. 5 
HOVE C2 1174 62 5.3 
TOTAL 3821 419 11.0 
EAST ,HASTINGS El 938 194 20.7 
ROT HER E2 649 60 9.2 
LEWES E3 674 79 ll. 7 
EASTBOURNE E4 1485 167 11.2 
TOTAL 3746 500 13.3 
COUNTY TOTALS TO DATE, THIS YEAR 13820 1648 11.9 
COUNTY TOTALS TO DATE, LAST YEAR 12915 1706 13.2 
INCREASE/DECREASE +906 -58 
% +7.0 -3.4 1.3 
TABLE 3 
llO. 
Appendix 2 
Design Recommendations 
! 
I 
I 
APPENDIX 2 
-RECOMMENDATIONS AT DESIGN STAGE 
{Adapted from HoiDe Office guidance to architectural liaison officers) 
2. Generally 
2.1.1Precise problem identification is the best antidote to unnecessary 
protection. 
2.1.2 Whilst the physical structure of any building may have certain 
similarities and require basic specifications to familiar risks, 
before considering security design measures there is a need to analyse 
the particular individual premises~ taking into account the type of 
business, its loCation, the type of crime likely to be committed 
against it, the likely perpetrators and the circumstances under which 
the crimes are likely to occur, including the manner and time span of 
commission. 
\ 
2.1.3 In order to prOvide an appropriate security design there is a need to 
answer the following questio.ns:-
i) What crimes are likely to impact the building? 
e.g. burglary. arson, damage or theft. 
ii) Who is likely to commit them? 
e.g. professional criminals, opportunists, juveniles or employees 
iii} How are they likely to occur? 
e.g. breaking into.prernises( causing damage to building fabric, 
stealing from storerooms or warehouses during duty time, creating 
disorder in public areas 
iv) When are they likely to occur? 
e.g. time of the day, day of the week, season of the year. 
v) What is the crime risk rate of the target premises? 
e.g. tobacco warehouse l in 5, supermarket l in 20. 
111. 
vi} What is the possible maximum loss in the event of an attack? 
i.e. the maximum loss that ~ould be sustained if the target were 
completely destroyed or stolen, e.g. arson in a paper warehouse~ 
vii) What is the probable maximum loss in the event of an attack? 
i.e. the amount of loss a target ~ould be more likely to sustain, 
e.g. a warehouse might contain a stock of electrical goods and 
office equipment. Whilst it is possible that the whole stock 
could be stolen, it is more likely that a thief would concentrate 
on the small, valuable, easily sold electrical items such as 
video recorders, calculators and televisions. Furthermore, it 
might be assumed that the loss would be restricted to what could 
be carried on one large truck. ·In practice the probable maximum 
loss would be the stock of electrical goods of an amount 
equivalent to one truck load. 
2.1.4 Risks Identification 
Identifying the crime risk of target premises is vital because it 
enables the specifier to gauge the likelihood of attack· for ·particular 
types qf. premises. Similarly the identification of a probable maximum 
loss is important because it allows the designer to assign priorities 
to the target riskS. It also enables him to establish realistic 
limits on the cost of the system he designs. Rarely is it acceptable 
to design a preventive system to match more than. the probable maximum 
loss. The overall objective _is to achieve a balanced preventive 
design which is not excessively costly, which reduces the risk of 
crime and consequent loss and which will not interfere unduly with the 
legitimate function, comfort, convenience and profitability of the 
client organisation. 
2.1.5 Risk Analysis 
There is a need on each occasion to analyse the problem carefully, 
identifying the potentially serious risks which might result in 
serious losses; measure the degree of those potentiai losses and 
determine those that are unacceptable, then match solutions to the 
problems in order that the potential for crime and loss can be kept 
within acceptable parameters. 
112. 
2.2 RECOMMENOATIONS 
The External EnvironmenL 
This is the external area surrounding the building to which 
recommendations or comments could have some effect. The following are 
some of the points the architect should look for:-
Natural Surveillance 
BS 8220 Pt.l Sec.l 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Secs. 
1;2;8 
BS 8220 Pt.3 Secs. 
2.3;2.7;3;4;5 
NHBC Guidelines 
Secs. 1;2;3 & 5 
113-
The building should be sited in 
such a way that it receives the 
maximum amount of natural 
surveillance by persons iD adjacent 
buildings and possibly from passing 
pedestrians and motorists. 
Consider formal surveillance i.e. 
CCTV in high risk situation. 
BoundaLY delineation 
BS 8220 Pt. Dec 2.7 
BS 8220 Pt. 3 
Sec's z.~i3:3:12:15 
Appendix G 
Landscaping 
BS 8220 Pt.l Sec.l 
BS 8220 Pt.3 
Sec's 3 & 4 
NHBC Guideline·s 
Sec's 2 & 3 
Lighting 
BS 8220 Pt.l 
Sec's 1;3 & 
Appendix A 
SS 8220 Pt.2 Sec.lO 
& Appendix L 
SS 8220 Pt. 3 
Sec's 2.8;13 
& Appendix E 
Essentials of Security 
Lighting - Electricity 
Council 
NHBC Guidelines 
Sec's 3;4 
·· .. 
114. 
A fence or similar barrier may be 
necessary to keep out trespassers. 
It should be noted~ however~ that 
conventional fencing should never be 
regarded as a means of keeping out 
potential intruders~ it creates 
territoriality. 
Landscaping should be kept at a low 
level particularly near doors and 
windows. Shrubs and bushes should ne 
of the hardy self protecting variety 1 
e.g. roses etc.. The. necessity for.·· 
ongoing maintenance of public 1and-
scaped areas should be considered. 
Young trees should not be planted too 
near the building. where in maturity 
they would provide a climbing frame to 
the roof or upper floors .. 
Security lighting can be a deterrent 
and should be inst~lled where 
appropriate. All units should be 
vandal resistant. 
Access 
BS 8220 Pt.1 Sec.l 
& Appendix A 
BS 8220 PL2· sec. 7 
& Appendix D 
BS 8220 Pt.3 Sec's 
2.14;2.19;6 & 
Appendix B 
Fire Prevention 
Note l/1970 
Car Parks 
BS 8220 Pt.l Sec.l 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec.3;5 
& Appendix F 
BS 8220 Pt.3 
Sec's 3.3;16.4;17 
& Appendix J & K 
NHBC Guidelines 
Sec's 1-5 
Petroleum 
(Consolidation) Act 
1928 
Outbuildings 
BS 8220 Pt.l. Sec.1 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec's l; 
2; 3 & Appendix A8 
NHBC: Guidelines 
Petroleum 
(Consolidation) 
Act 1928 
ll5. 
Vehicular and pedestrian access 
to the building should be sited so 
that supervision can be given ~frq@ 
the building. Consideration should 
be given to access for emergency 
vehicles which may be a statutory 
requirement 
Sited where they can be supervised 
from the building and illuminated. 
Multi-storey and underground car 
parks may be subject to conditions 
under Petroleum Spirit. Licence in 
respect of fire fighting equipment~ 
means of· escape and lighting. 
Outbuildings such as plant rooms~ 
bin shelters etc •• t.o·-be ... sited 
in such a position that they do not 
obscure vulnecable parts of the 
building. and do not provide easy 
access to the roof or upper floors. 
The. security of the outbuildings 
should be considered~ 
The ideal situation would be to 
have the. functions of the 
outbuildings witt1i~ the structure 
of the building~ 
Alaom Box Covers 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec.J-4; 
5.7;8.2:10.3 
BS 8220 Pt.3 Sec.3.3; 
14 & 21 
BS 4737 Intruder 
Alarm System in 
Buildings 
NHBC Guidelines 
Sec.4 
The Physical Barrier 
The existence of an intruder alarm 
system should be advertised. 
Alarm box covers. including 
dummy ones. should be placed in 
prominent positions. 
The physical barrier is· the shell of the building itself. i.e. 
walls, roof. doors and windows. etc. Many of the recommendations 
in this section -would be similar to crime prevention advice 
given for existing buildings. Examples of this area are:_-_ 
Building Lines To be kept as clear as possible 
BS 8220 Pt.l Sec.l to assist·supervision and prevent 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec's 1: climbing to the roof or upper 
2 • 3. 3.11 floors 
NHBC Guidelines 
Sec's 2 & 3 
Recesses Recessed areas that receive no 
BS 8220 Pt.l Sec.l supervision should be avoided 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec's 1· wherever possible. 
2;3.3.11 
NIH3C Guidelines 
Sec's 2 & 3 
116. 
External. Doors 
BS 8220 Pt.1 Sec.3 
& Appendix A 1.2.3 
BS 8220 -~f.2 Sec.5 
BS 8220 Pt.3 Sec's 
2.9;3.3;6;7 & 8 
BS 5588 Fire 
P~ecautions in the 
design and 
construction of 
buildings Pts.l;2;3 
BS 1186 Pts.l & 2 
Timber for and 
workmanship in· 
Joinery 
BS 1245 Metal door 
frames 
BS ·3621 Specification 
for thief resistant 
locks 
BS 4878 Internal and 
external doorsteps. 
leaves and frames 
NHBC Guidelines Sec.3 
117. 
Consider their intended use 
position. type. style. material 
composition etc._ 
Recommendations will vary 
accordingly but in the broadest 
terms the designer should look 
for maximum strength in and 
unrestricted view of. all 
external doors 
Fire exit doors require 
special consideration because 
of the balance between safety 
and security. 
Windows 
BS 8220 Pt.l Sec.2 
& Appendix A3 
BS 8220 fL2 
Sec's 4 & 6 
BS 8220 Pt.3 
Sec's 2.11;3.3;5 
BS 4873 Aluminium 
Alloy windows 
NHBC Guidelines 
Iron Bars & Grilles 
BS 8220 Pt.l Sec·.z 
& Appendix A3 
BS 8220 Pt.2 
Sec's. 4 & 6 
BS 8220 Pt.3 
Sec's 2.11;3.3;5 
BS 4873 Aluminium 
Alloy windows 
NHBC Guidelines 
Sec.3 
118. 
Windows are probably the weakest 
point in any building. 
Considec quantity of ventilation 
and position as well as type and 
size of frame. method of opening. 
fixed panes of glass. window locks, 
limited opening etc. Avoid 
external glazing beads to fix glass. 
It is at this point that the 
architect has the .opportunity to 
alter the design of the window to 
maximise security. 
Louvre·windows should be avoided. 
NB Reduced glazed areas can save 
money and energy. 
The use of such hard·measures·of 
security may be resisted by the 
architect or planning officer as 
.being visually intrusive. 
They should only be recommended 
in high risk areas where all 
alternatives have been exhausted 
Glass 
BS 8220 Pt.l Sec.4 
·BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec.6 
BS 8220 ~i.l Sec's 
2.12 & 12 
BS 952 Pt.l Glass 
for Glazing 
BS 5051 Security 
Glazing Pt.l Bullet 
Resistant Interior 
Pt.2 Bullet Resis-
tant Exterior 
BS 5357 Code of 
Practice for instal-
lation of security 
gl_azing 
BS 5544 Specification 
for anti-bandit 
glazing 
BS 6202 specification 
for i"inpact 
performance for 
safety glass and 
plastic 
NHBC Guidelines Sec.3 
Roof 
BS 8220 Pt.l Sec.2 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec's 
3;7 & Appendix AS 
BS 8220 Pt.3 Sec's 
2.14 & 11 
NHBC Guidelines Sec~3 
119. 
Glass needs special consideration. 
There is a distinct difference in 
the risk from the housebreaker to 
the vandal. Once the major risk 
has been determined, security 
recommendations should be 
commensurate with that risk. 
In a well supervised area of the 
bUilding normal glass could suffice. 
In an unsupervised area 
consideration could be given to 
the glass alternatives·such as 
laminated glass or polycarbonates. 
Security glazing must be considered 
for risk areas. 
Consideration to be given to the 
pitch. the overhang, fabric. 
accessibility. roof ligh~s, etc~ 
External Pipes 
BS 8220 Pt.l 
Sec.l.6. 
BS 8220~t.2 Sec.7.6 
BS 8220 Pt.3 Sec.ll.7 
NHBC Guidelines Sec.3 
Walls 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec.3.3 
BS 8220 Pt. 3 ~, 
Sec's 2.13;11 
Pub~ic Utilities 
7.4 Interior Areas 
To be flush or concealed to_ prevent 
climbing to the roof or upper 
floors. 
Consider the finishes available~ 
with particular emphasis on anti-
graffiti material on the 
··ground floor 
Consideration should be given 
to protection of gas 1 electricity, 
water~ oil supplies and 
telephone connections. 
This section deals with all the security implications of the 
interior of ·the building. The.following are examples of some 
of the areas of concern. 
Target Areas 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec's 
3.4;9 Appendix H 
BS 8220 Pt.3 Sec's 
2.17;3.4;4;9;18;19 
Appendices L;M;N 
120. 
Specific areas that will be a target 
for the criminal element. These 
must be identified and their 
vulnerability considered. It would 
be advantageous from a security 
point of view, if •target areas• 
were concentrated in one part of 
the building which would allow 
for maximum security measures 
being implemented at minimum cost. 
Secure Stores 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec's 
3.4;9 & Appendix H 
BS 8220 Pt.3 Sec's 
2 . 17 ; 2. 4 '9' 18' 19 
Appendices L;M~N 
Vulnerable Offices 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec's 
3.4;9 & Appendix H 
BS 8220 Pt.3 Sec's 
2.17;2.4;9;18;19 
·Appendices L;M;N 
Stock Rooms 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec's 
3.4;9 & Appendix H 
BS 8220 Pt.3 Sec's 
2.17;3.4;9;18;19 & 
Appendices L;M;N 
BS 822.0 Pt. 2 
Appendix E 
BS 8220 Pt. 3 
Appendices L;M;N;Q 
Cash Handling 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec's 
3.4;9 & Appendix K 
BS 8220 Pt.3 
Appendix R 
Access Control 
OS 8220 Pt.2 Sec.S 
1\prcndix u 
OS 8220 Pt.3 Sec's 
3.4;1G & A[>pcndix P 
l2l. 
Consideration to be given to their 
overall strength and positioning 
within the building to ensure 
proper usage. Secure stores at 
first floor level of physical 
protection required for windows. 
Certain offices in some buildings 
are, from experience more 
vulnerable than others. e.g. in 
schools greater security should 
be given to the Headmaster's and 
Secretary's office. 
Obvious targets which must be 
properly protected. 
Offices in which cash is dealt 
must be positioned in the 
building for maximum protection. 
Consideration should be given to 
provide secure areas for delivery 
and collection of cash. 
The control and supervision of 
pccsons entering a building must 
be considered. 
Staf( Rooms 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec.3.4 
Appendix.H 1.7 
BS 8220 Pt.J Sec.l6.6 
Intcuder Alax:ms 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Sec's 
3.4;5.7;8.2;10.3 
& Appendices A & G 
BS 8220 Pt.J Sec's 
2.6;2.18;3.3;14;21 
& Appendix F 
BS 4 7 37 Intruder 
Alarm System in 
Buildings 
NHBC G~idelines 
Sec.4-. 
ACPO and Force 
Policy 
.. 
122. 
Staff Rooms in public buildings 
and offices to be protected 
against sneak in thefts etc. 
Entrances/Exits to staff rooms in 
facto~:ies and shops should be 
sited where they can be supervised 
to prevent thefts of stock~ etc .• 
by members of staff. 
Despite the high perGentage of false 
alarm calls. intruder alarm systems 
do provide an effective back up to good 
physical security. Their presence 
has a deterrent effect" and in many 
instances their installation is 
included in the architect's brief 
from his client. 
Recommendations should be made so 
that optimum coverage is achieved. 
l-
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APPENDIX 2 (Cont'd) 
CHECKLISTS FOR ARCHITECTS RELATED TO BUILDING fUNCTION 
CAR PARKS 
CRIME RISKS 
1.1 Thefts of and from vehicles 
1. 2 Tt1efts from the person 
1.3 Assault/Robbery/Rape 
POINTS TO CONSIDER 
2.1 Layout 
2.2 Entrances and Exits 
2·. 3 Open area parking: 
Hard Surfaces 
Landscaping 
Surveillance of area 
2.4 Enclosed parking' 
Stairways/lifts 
'circulation of traffic 
Wall colour finish 
CCTV 
2.5 Cash collection: 
Manuals - Kiosks 
Automatic systems 
2 _ 6 Lighting 
2.7 Pedestrian access 
2.8 Graffiti Management 
2.9 Additional uses i.e. taxi r-ank. shop 
kiosk. and car valcting 
2.10 
2_l_L 
Vandal resistant nwtecials 
M:.1 in ten a nee 
Con:-> ider.:-
f\<Jdi.u:;t Ccime 
123. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
HOSPITALS 
CRIME RISKS - i.e. theft, vandalism, personal attack, 
drug offences 
' ' 
CONSIDER LOCATION - i#e. urban~ rural, neighbouring sites 
THE GROUNDS 
3.1 Assess the layout 
3.2 Are there any through routes? 
3.3 Visible entrances 
3.4 Lockable outbuildings 
3.5 Are the buildings clear of the boundary? 
3.6 Control of external storage facilities 
3.7 Restriction of vehicle access 
3 .. 8 Separate car parking facilities. for residents, 
staff and visitors 
3.9 Natural surveillance of car parking areas 
POINTS OF ACCESS 
4 .. 1 Can numbers be reduced, consider vehicles and 
pedestrians separately 
4.2 Select appropriate gates and barriers 
PERIMETER BARRIER 
5 .. 1 Consider type and size of perimeter fencing or 
walls 
5.2 Visibility and surveillance 
5.3 Planting - type and size 
EXTERNA!. IGHTING AND SURVEILLANCE 
6.1 Is there a need for security patrol? 
6.2 Illumination levels 
6.3 Perimeter lighting 
124. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
OTHER FACTORS 
7.1 External storage protection 
7.2 Notices -adequate directional signs 
7.3 Police liaison 
7. 4 Fuel storage 
7.5 Site storekeeping and management 
7.6 Delivery control 
7.7 Private parking 
THE BUILDING 
8.1 Entrances and Exits 
8.1.1 Keep number to a minimum 
8.1.2 Locate for security 
8.1.3 Establish locking route 
8.1.4 Designated means of escape should be 
monitored for misuse 
8.1.5 Security doors should open outwards 
8.1.6 Avoid panelled or hollow cored doors 
8.1.7 Avoid low level glazing 
8.1.8 Care with ironmongery specification 
8.1.9 Avoid rim locks 
8.1.10 Provide deadlocks where possible 
8.1.11 Master suiting of keys 
8.2 WindowS 
8.2.1 Check location (ground floor easy access) 
8.2.2 Number of opening lights. Any dimensions 
over 125 mm. Operating mechanism 
8.2.3 Consider bars or grilles 
8.2.4 Glass type 
8.3 Roof 
8.3.1 Examine access, i.e. easily climbed 
8.3.2 Examine openings and rooflights 
INSIDE THE BUILDING 
9.1 RiskS Areas 
9.1.1 Locate cash offices. pharmacy. dr-ugs stor-e. 
etc. within pcotcctive surroundingS 
9.1.2 Avoid recessed aceas. especially on cash routes 
9.1.3 Separ-ate despotch and delivery 
125. 
10. 
ll. 
12. 
9~1~4 Provide checking area 
9~1~5 Provide staff changing rooms and secure 
personal storage 
~~1.6 Secure machines/photocopiers etc~ 
9. 2 Propet:-ty 
9~2~1 Establish observation 
9.2~2 Protect goods, i.e. linen etc. 
9.3 Internal Doors 
9.3.1 Decide locking policy 
9.3.2 Control key issue 
9.3.3 Avoid sliding doors 
9.3.4 Avoid panelled/glazed doors in secure areas 
9.345 Fit spyholes in risk areas 
9.3.6 Access control for secure areas 
9.4 Internal Lighting 
9.4.1 Leave planned lights on at night 
9~4.2 Illuminate secure store areas and s.afes 
\ (visible from outside) 
TERRORISM AND PERSONAL SAFETY 
10.1. 
10.2 
10.3 
10.4 
10.5 
Define likelihood 
Establish search and evacuation procedures for 
bomb alerts 
Protect cash carrying staff 
Duress - brief staff for response 
Install alarms in high risk locations 
PERSONAL SAFETY - Nursing Staff 
11.1 Consider siting of nurses accommodation - access 
control* lighting. footpaths. surveillance etc. 
/\CCESS CONTROL 
12.1 Is there a need. examine movement/communication 
pattC!:"OS 
12.2 
12.3 
12.4 
Select app!:"opr:iatc system {key/car:-d/code/per:sonal) 
Set out policy 
Design master- key system· 
126. 
13. 
Consider:-
VANDALISM 
13.1 Avoid loose gravel. copings or other potential 
missiles 
13. 2 ,. 
13.3 
13.4 
13.5 
13.6 
13.7 
13.8 
.Use of vandal resistant materials for lighting 
Light entrances 
Avoid external rainwater pipes 
Avoid low level glazing 
Consider glazing materials 
Use easily cleaned surface finishes 
Protect new planting 
NHS Security Guidelines 
127. 
L 
2. 
CRIME RISK 
Ll Theft, 
HOTELS 
Employee 
Resident 
Visitor 
1.2 Vehicles: Theft of and from 
POINTS TO CONSIDER 
2.1 Natural Surveillance 
2.2 Exterior - Boundary 
Roadways 
Car Parks 
Recreation areas (swimming, tennis, etc) 
Landscape 
Lighting 
2.3 Access Control 
2.4 Physical Security - exterior entrances 
2.5 Public Lobby 
2.6 Reception & Cashier 
2.7 Public Restaurants 
2.8 Other public areas e.g. Cinemas 
2.9 
2.10 
2.11 
2.12 
2.13 
2.14 
2.15 
2.16 
2.17 
2.18 
Luggage Rooms 
Interior Doors 
Room Key Security 
Guest Property 
Lost and Found Property 
Theatres 
Banqueting 
Night Clubs 
Cash Collection and Handling 
Bomb Threat - Evacuation etc. 
Fire Exit Alarms 
CCTV 
Sccur:ity Management 
128. 
l. 
2. 
Consider: 
INDUSTRIAL PREMISES 
CRIME RISKS 
l. L , .Theft - Employee 
Delivery Area 
External Storage Areas 
1.2 Burglary 
1.3 Cash in transit 
1.4 Commercial Espionage 
1.5 Vandalism and Arson 
POINTS TO REMEMBER 
2.1 Perimeter Security 
2.2 Security Control Point 
2.3 CCTV etc 
2.4 Storage Areas 
2.5 Car Parks -
2.6 Goods Delivery/Loading Area 
2.7 Access Points 
2.8 Service Inlets/Outlets (e.g. water, cooling, 
2.9 
2.10 
2.11 
2.L2 
2.D 
2.L4 
2.LS 
2.16 
2.17 
2.18 
Roof Access 
EmergenCy Fire Exits 
Warehouse Layout 
Waste Disposal Areas 
fuel oil etc) 
External Doors~ roller shutters 
Windows - eliminate unnecessary windows 
Reception Areas 
Internal Control Zones 
Administration area: ComputeL OepaLtment 
Cashiers Office 
Research & Development - control of data 
OS 8220 Pt.2 Security of Ouildings Against Crime 
- Offices and Shops 
DS 8220 Pt~J Security of Uuildings Against·-Crime 
- Warehouses and Distribution Units 
129. 
l. 
2. 
Con~;idcr:-:-
OFFICES 
CRIME RISKS 
l.l Walk-in Th~ft 
1.2 Burglary 
1.3 Theft by deception/fraud 
1.4 Vandalism 
1.5 Loss of information 
1.6 Theft by employee 
POINTS TO CONSIOER 
2.1 Site location/landscape 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
External areas: 
Building: 
Internal: 
Car Parks 
Entrance/Exits 
Paths/roads 
Lighting 
Fences/gates 
CCTV 
Delivery area 
Waste disposal 
Access points 
Fire Exits 
Loading Bays 
Basement areas 
Plant Rooms 
External Stairways 
Roof Access 
Doors/Windows 
Entrance 
Lobby 
Reception 
Access Control 
Cash Office 
Lifts/Stairs/Corridors 
Computer area 
Executive Offices 
Cantccn/Staffrooms 
Key suiting 
BS 8220 Pt.2 Secucity o( Uuildings Against Crime 
- Offices and St1ops 130. 
L 
2. 
PUBLIC BUILDINGS 
CRIME RISKS 
Ll Theft 
L2 Assault 
LJ Burglary 
L4 Fraud 
LS Arson 
L6 Vandalism 
L7 Espionage 
L8 Terrorism 
L9 Rioting 
POINTS TO CONSIDER 
2~1 Location 
2.2 External - Public Areas 
·. 
Secure Areas 
Boundaries 
Car Parks 
Pathways 
Lighting 
Public Information Signs 
Fencing 
2.3 Physical Security - Access Control 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
2.10 
2 .ll 
2.12 
2.1.3 
Access Control 
Reception Area 
Lobbies 
Lifts 
Doors 
Windows 
Glazing Material 
Internal Corridors/Stairs 
fire Doors 
Walls 
Computer Areas 
Basement Aceas 
CCTV & elcctconic monitoring 
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Consider: 
2.14 
2.15 
2.16 
2.17 
2.18 
2.19 
2.20 
2.21 
Bomb security & elevation 
Switch/plant rooms 
Ceiling areas and service ducts 
Waste disposal area 
Mail room 
Cash security 
Antiques/paintings/silverware 
Goods delivery 
BS 8220 Part 2 Design of Buildings Against 
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l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
RESIDENTIAL CENTRES FOR THE ELDERLY /MENTALLY lll\NDICAPPED 
CRIME R!SKS - i~e .. theft, vandalism. personal attac!~ 
. ·' 
CONSIDER LOCATIONS - i.e. urban. rural. neighbouring sites 
THE GROUNDS 
3.1 Assess the layout 
3.2 Are there any through routes? 
3.3 Private driveways, i.e. symbolic gateways 
3.4 Visible entrances 
3.5 Lockable o~tbuildings 
3.6 Separate employee parking. Position for 
surveillance 
3.7 Planting size and type 
POINTS OF ACCESS 
4.1 Keep to a minimum 
.4.2 Consider vehicles and pedestrians separately 
4 .. 3 Select appropriate gates/barriers 
PERIMETER BARRIER 
5.1 Type afid·size of perimeter fencing or walls 
5.2 Visibility and surveillance 
5.3 Physical strength 
EXTERNAL IGHTING AND SURVEILLANCE 
6.1 Point or area lighting 
6.2 Illumination levels 
6.3 Perimeter lighting 
OTHER FACTORS 
7.1 Staff levels 
7 _ 2 Residents numbers 
7. 3 Site storekeeping/management 
7.4 Oelivecy control 
7.5 Joint use of facilities 
1.8 Notices -adequate dirccti011al signs 
l3 3. 
8. 
9. 
THE: BUILDING 
8.1 Walls 
8~1.1 Define likelihood ci vandalism 
8.2 Entrances and Exits 
8.2.1 Keep numbers to a minimum 
8.2.2 Locate for security 
8.2.3 Staff audible alaom signal 
8.2.4 Exit only after pre-set time 
8.2.5 Alarm designated means of escape 
8.2.6 Open security doors outwards 
8.2.7 Avoid double leaf doors wherever possible 
8.2.8 Avoid low level glazing 
8.2.9 Care·with ironmongery 
8.2.10 Define likelihood of vandalism 
8.2.11 Consider access control 
8.3 Windows 
8.3.1 ChecK location (ground floor or easy access) 
8.3.2 Simple and easy to operate. Must be 
restricted internally 
8.3.3 Glass type 
INSIDE THE BUILDING 
9.1 Risk Areas 
9.1.1 
9 .1.2 
9.1. 3 
9 .1.4 
9.1. 5 
Create secure storerooms 
Drugs to be close to staff accommodation 
Provide staff changing rooms and secure 
personal storage 
Mark items of valuable equipment 
Reception Facilities with audible alarm 
9.2 Interna Doors 
9.2.1 Avoid panelled/Glazed doors 
9. 3 Internal Lighting 
9.3.1 Leave planned lights on at nigl1t 
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10. 
11. 
PERSONAL SAFETY 
10~1 Install alarms in risk situations 
10.2 Consider fire risk or life risk 
10. 3 1 • E:;>cape security 
10.4 Establish search and evacuation procedures 
VANDALISM 
11.1 Chain link fencing may be subject to damage 
11.2 
11.3 
11.4 
11.5 
11.6 
ll. 7 
Avoid loose stones or gravel etc. 
Keep planting neat and tidy 
Use easily cleaned surface material 
Consider glazing materials 
Use vandal resistant light fittings 
Protect new planting 
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l. 
2. 
J. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
SCHOOLS 
CRIME RISKS - i.e. vandalism. burglary~ arson, theft 
CONSIDER LOCATION - i.e. urban. rural. neighbouring sites 
THE GROUNDS 
3.1 Assess the layout 
3.2 Are there through routes? 
3. 3 ·visible entrances 
3.4 Lockable outbuildings 
3.5 Is the building clear of the boundary? 
3. 6 Control· external storage facilities 
3.7 Car parking facilities 
3.8 Planting'- size and type 
POINTS OF ACCESS 
4.1 Keep to the absolute minimum 
4.2 Select appropriate gates and barriers 
PERIMETER BARRIER 
5.1 Type and size of perimeter fencing or walls 
Chain 11nk fencing may" be subject to damage 
5.2 Visibility and surveillance 
5.3 Planting- size and type 
EXTERNAL LIGHTING AND SURVEILLANCE 
6.1 Is there a security patrol? 
6.2 Paints of area lighting 
6.3 Illumination levels 
6.4 Perimeter lighting 
OTIJER FACTORS 
7.1 Alarm System 
7.2 External storage protection 
7.3 Notices- adequate diccctional signs 
7.4 Police liaison 
7.~ Joint use of facilities 
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8. 
9. 
THE BUILDING 
8.1 Walls 
8.1.1 Define likelihood of vandalism 
8.1.2 Consider strength and construction 
8.2 Entrances and Exits 
8.2.1 Keep numbers to a minimum 
Avoid hidden recesses 
8.2.2 Designate final exit 
8.2.3 Locate for security 
8.2.4 Establish locking routine 
8.2.5 Designated means of escape should 
be monitored fo~ misuse 
8.2.6 Open security doors outwards 
8.2.7 Avoid double leaf doors 
8.2.8 Avoid panelled or hollow cored doors 
8.2.9 Avoid low level glazing 
8.2.10 Care with ironmongery specification 
8.2.11 Avoid rim locks. Provide deadlocks 
wherever possible 
8.2.12 Consider multiple locking 
8.2.13 Define likelihood of vandalism 
8.3 Windows 
8.3.1 .. Check location (ground floor for easy 
access 
8.3.2 Minimise the number of opening lights 
8.3.3 Restrict openings internally. rather 
than individual locks 
8.3.4 Glass type 
8.4 Roof 
8.4.1 Examine access 
8.4.2 Examine openings and roof lights 
INSIDr, THE BUILDING 
9.1 Risk Areas 
9.1.1 Design concentcic zones. Gcoup targets 
together 
9.1.2 Pcovide staff changing rooms and secure 
personal s to cage 
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10. 
11. 
9.1.3 Is there a reception facility 
9.1.4 Mark items of valuable/portable equipment 
9.1.5 Create secure storerooms 
9.2 Internal Doors 
9.2.1 Decide locking policy 
9.2.2 Control key issue 
9.2.3 Avoid sliding doors 
9.3 Ceilings 
9.3.1 Check access possibilities area to area 
9.3.2 Check vulnerability of services 
9.3.3 Bolt trap doors from below 
9. 4 Internal Lighting 
9.4.1 Leave planned lights on at night 
INTRUDER DETECTION 
10.1 Define risk level of protection required 
10.2 
10.3 
10.4 
Estimate consequences of failures 
Comply with BS 4737. Suggest ~onitored system 
Locate control panels discreetly, close to 
fire exit door 
VANDALISM 
11.1 Avoid loose gravel, copings or other potential 
missiles 
11.2 
11.3 
11.4 
11.5 
11.6 
11.7 
11.8 
11.9 
Use easily cleaned surface finishes 
Use vandal resistant materials for lighting 
Avoid through routes 
Consider glazing materials 
Avoid low level glazing 
Light entrances 
Protect new planting 
Avoid external rainwater pipes 
Consider:- Department of Education and Science Guidelines 
138. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
SHOPPING PRECINCTS 
CRIME RISKS 
1.1 Theft ( Shopli ·cting I Employee) 
1.2 Bu~gla~y 
1.3 Vandalism 
1. 4 Public Order 
1. 5 Robbery 
RISK AREAS 
2.1 Off Licences 
2.2 Department Stores 
2.3 Stationery and Book Shops 
2.4 Tobacconists 
2.5 Clothiers and Outfitters 
2.6 Electrical Goods Stores 
2.7 Chemists 
2.8 Fast Food Restaurants 
2.9 Banks and Building Societies 
POINTS TO CONSIDER 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
3.5 
3.6 
3.7 
3.8 
3. 9 . 
3.10 
3.11 
3.12 
3.13 
3.14 
3.15 
3.16 
Access points 
Car ParK Location - (also additional list} 
Delvery Areas 
Unsupervised Areas 
Landscaping (External & Internal Planters) 
Cash Collection/Delivery 
CCTV and Monitoring 
Security Management/Staff 
Opening and Closing Times 
Lighting Levels 
Toilets 
Anti vandal surfaces 
Key holding 
Roof Areas 
Public Place/Highway 
Policing Arrangements 
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3.17 
3.18 
3.19 
3.20 
Central Station or Collector Points for Alarms 
Public Seating 
Fire Exits and Automatic Ventilators 
Nuisance caused by youths con£regating 
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l. 
2. 
LEISURE AREAS 
CRIME RISKS 
1.1 . T.heft 
1.2 Vehicle Crime 
1.3 Assault 
1.4 Vandalism 
1.5 Public Order 
POINTS TO CONSIDER 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
2.10 
2.11 
2.12 
2.13 
2.15 
2.16 
2.17 
Boundary definition~ walls, fences & gates 
Landscape 
Footpaths and roadways 
Car parking 
Lighting 
Natural Surveillance 
Mechanical Surveillance 
Security Patrols 
Storage Areas· 
Waste Disposal 
Reception Area and Lobbies 
Lifts and Corridors 
Toilets~ 
Licenced Areas 
Cash Office 
Cash Collection 
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l. 
2. 
Consider:-
LEISURE CENTRES 
CRIME RISKS 
1.1 Theft {Equipment and PeLsonal eff~cts) 
1.2 Burglary 
1.3 Vandalism 
1.4 Public Order 
POINTS TO CONSIDER 
2.1 Suitability of location 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
2.10 
2.11 
2.12 
2.13 
2.14 
Ease of supervision by staff 
Formalise entrances and exits 
Parking provision {natural supervision) 
Landscaping 
External lighting 
Security of users property (lockers} 
Identify nuisance potential to fellow users 
by others 
Use of CCTV for security and management benefit 
Potential problems for nearby business or 
residential premises by site users 
Vandal resistance of materials used in 
construction of building and amenity items 
Bar facility - security 
Amusement machines 
Cash handling 
BS 8220 Part 2 Security of Buildings Against 
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APPENDIX 3 
Questions forming basis of 
interviews with 
Company Directors 
APPENDIX 3 
QUESTIONS PUT TO COMPANY DIRECTORS DURING INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS 
' . 
l. NATURE OF BUSINESS OR OPERATION 
2. HOW IS IT AFFECTED BY CRIME 
3. DO YOU HAVE PREMISES IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS 
4. IF SO, ARE SOME LOCATIONS MORE VULNERABLE 
THAN OTHERS 
5. IN WHAT WAY? 
6. CAN YOU QUANTIFY THE ANNUAL COST TO YOUR 
ORGANISATION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY? 
7. DO YOU HAVE A .FORMAL POLICY ON SECURITY 
8. DO YOU EMPLOY SECURITY PERSONNEL? 
9. WHAT TYPES Of SECURITY DEVICE DO YOU USE? 
1.0. 1\HE THCY GCNERALLY EFTECTIVE? 
1. l. DO YOU FEr:I. THI\T THE INHERENT SECUR !TY OF 
BU [ l.D I.NG~-; COULD UE IMPROVED AT DES I.GN STAGE"! 
12. !I·' ~;O, !IOW! 
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YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
APPENDIX 3 (Cont'd) 
13. 
14. 
DO YOU BRIEF YOUR ARCHITECT ON SECURITY NEEDS 
DO YOU MON~TOR THE INCIDENCE OF CRIME AS IT 
AFFECTS YOUR ORGANISATION? 
15.. WHICH SOURCES OF ADVICE DO YOU FIND TO BE 
MOST USEFUL ON THE SUBJECT OF CRIME 
PREVENTION? 
16. DO YOU FEEL THAT TOO MUCH SECURITY COULD HAVE 
AN ADVERSE EFFECT ONYOUR BUSINESS? 
17. IF "YES", IN WHAT WAY? 
18. DO YOU FEEL THAT BUILT-IN ·SECURITY MEASURES 
SHOULD HAVE THE SAME LEGAL STATUS AS FIRE 
PREVENTION REQUIREMENTS? AND THAT BUILDINGS SHOULD 
BE REQUIRED TO BE INSPECTED FROM TIME TO TIME TO 
ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS? 
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YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
\, .. 
APPENDIX 4 
Quot7s from Interviews 
·. 
APPENDIX 4 
QUOTES FROM INTERVIEWS 
.QUOTES FROM INTERVIEWS 
l. "You would need to brick up every window and even that wouldn't 
stop a det~~mined thief" (Member - RCS) 
2. "If you can thwart the guy who breaks into buildings he will 
simply turn to a nastier form of crime, e.g. robbery 
··(Member - RCS) 
3. "BuJ:"glary is the least of our problems - shoplifting and ·staff 
pilfering cause us more headaches and financial losses than any 
other form of crime. (Director of large retailer} 
4. "What worries us more than anything else is an attack on our 
main computer. That doesn't bear thinking about". 
of large retaile~). 
{Director 
5. "If our recommendations had th~ power of legislation behind 
them we could make a lot more progress towards designing out 
crime". (Crime Prevention Officer) 
6~ "It's not only crime itself. but the fear of becming a victim 
of it that frightens people•. (Crime Prevention Officer) 
7. "Crime prevention should be a cor~, ~subject in schools of 
archiecture". (Practising Architect) 
8. "\lj'e • ve been done twice, each time they smashed a window - how can 
we pr.evenL that happening again? (Victim of domestic burglary) 
9. "t'\fe haven • t got anything worth pinching" {Frequent comment by 
members of general public) 
10. "It's difficult: enough to satisfy fire officers. building control, 
planning officers and t:he cLient:! We can do without anyone else 
tal_li_ng us what to do!'' (Architect) 
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APPENDIX 5 
Nottingham University 
Architectural Liaison Officers 
Programme 
APPENDIX 5 
niversity of Nottingham School of Architecture 
,, ' 
0.15 approx. 
10.30-11.45 
1.45- 13.00 
3.00- 14.00 
4.00- 15.00 
5.00- 15.30 
5.30- 15.45 
6.00 
Architectural liaison Officers 
Programme 
Wednesday 21st. July 1993 
Arrive 
coffee and welcome. 
Education of Architects 
Alastair Gardner 
Group Field Exercise 
Robert Jones 
Project on site analysis and design proposals 
to reduce crime 
Working Lunch 
Group Work 
Secure By Design 
Alastair Gardner 
Getting the message across; the use of 
good examples 
Discussion and tea 
Depart Nottingham 
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comment on, 
The Existing: 
List the shortcomings of the scheme as you 
see it together with the likely reasons 
Proposed Re~edies: 
What can be done to improve matters and why 
do you consider they would work 
Future Proposals: 
W11.at lessons can be learned for the future 
and hovl can- you inf:luence mat tern 
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APPENDIX 6 
Home Office Crime Prevention Centre 
Typical Syllabus 
Architectur~l Liaison Officers' Course 
O'X0 
Op<n Forum R<S~tMtioo ol Stu<lents 
DL'tcliJ>g Sl>!l 0950 Directing SW'( lnterpretJltlon ol Plans Syndlcote Presentations for 
Mr. 0. DicLI<ln E.xerc!S< No. l 0955 G~a\cr Manch..:~ter PoUc.e Trn,·el to Olrco o ng StaJT 
·STRA11!CLYDE tfNlY!:RS!l'Y 
JC>45 Student lntrO<luctJua 
COFFEE & WELCOME Syndicate Co.st Scudle.< 
• E>~rcls. No. l & Cunr:nt ProJe..:ts 
·: · ~dng Staff & ALOs Dire<:tir.g swr of Mchltect.s 1105 
Dr.ll.i'rey 
.The Plunnlag Procoss 
Llgbtlng for the Dollt Snvlrooments 1155 • Polite.~ Plnonen< Field Exercise • Erre<ts en Crlcne Mr. N. Bell 
Mr. I. Kr>ow!es Dutl" er no Archi!<C!lJrol Llol>on Assistallt ChleC P!Mllin& Of!iC<r, In eo/laCeration with nnlor ScniorUsbting E~inecr 
Review& CIOS< 
1W:l Olfi<tr O!IIS$0W 
.tJJUlt.nl archiuttl, tht. ALO 
~ling Staff tOIU"It :tYd.ttttJ 'JViJl u.gagt L1 a 1250 Ch. lnsp. B. Hewert fi4ld I rip wil.\ a ~ltw toduignbts Home Offi~ Crime ?revention Ce-ntre 
d criml ttsiJtaN o~iu, mutiflg thl 
a.Jptrat1on.t of 4tt:.Mtt:ll ats.d 
ALO: and in Utping wirA th1 1400 rtqwirt.mtflll af form and 
Syndicate Cas. Studies 1-' Cri:n~ Prevcntton Tb.rough fiU\r:li.cN::.Ury, 
• Exerd.s< Nu.l "" Ol 1445 Envll'i>n:ncnt.al Dr:ilgn llrienns ror Excrcl" Nt'- l WORK/NO LUNCH 
& s,,\Jred by Design l'otcrl>orouyb Southern Tewoshl~ S~1.1dlcnte ,\ • Srudy ut by 01. ln::.-p. B. fJn,"Ctt Directing Staff Demonstration or P.C. R.1ffia 1450 Home om~ Cri~ PteYe:'lcion Ctntn Computer De.lgn (C<t>ttal Sco<l"'d PoUa:) 
Syndicate 1\ ·Study''" by 1535 
7'£,1 Sg1. 1. Ri<lwdson I. {Lothio.n & Jlonk" PoliO<) 
Syndlcote C ·Study'"' by De.<lgn Ch. In•p. ll. He.,ett 1555 
(Home.Offic.e Crime. Prtvcntion ~ntrt} Re tu m 1640 Secured by Desigr1 4 t\lt Aspect.<; Preparation for Exercis<> No. 1 
.. Cn. lr.sp. D. He wen 
Ditecting S•Uf Pro<tko.l Experiences of :u> ALO 1645 HolD'! Offie! Ctim: Preve.ndon Centre 
Discu.,ion jtrlod led by: 
P.C. Jfna 1730 S g' 1 Ri cJw>iooD 
Ch. Insp. B. Hewe11 
--------------------------------------------------------1 
APPENDIX 7 
Defensible Space Hierarchy 
in housing units 
(2) 
ate 
Private 
Semi-
Private 
Private 
.. 
Defensible Space hierarchy in housing blocks 
Semi-
Private 
Semi-Public 
PUBliC 
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Semi-
Private· 
Private 
Private 
Appendix 8 
Table of categories of 
individuals interviewed 
Appendix 8 
Table of interviewees (See Chapters 2 and 4) 
Reference 
MDl 
MD 2 
MD 3 
MD 4 
so 
c 
LGA l 
2 
3 
4 
PA l 
2 
3 
AL 
RCS 1-
2 
HO 
ALO 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
in text 
' 
Position held or category 
of interviewee 
Managing Director 
(Retail Organisation) 
Managing Director 
(Manufacturing) 
Managing Director 
(Service Industry) 
Managing Director 
(Public Transport) 
Security Officer 
(Retail Organisation) 
Sociologist Specialising 
in Criminal Behaviour 
Senior Architect 
(Local Authority) 
Achitect 
{Partners in private 
pr?-ctice) 
Architect/Senior Lecturer 
at University 
Detectives on Regional 
Crime Squad 
Director of Home Office 
Crime Prevention Centre 
Architectural liaison 
officers from different 
police authorities 
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Number interviewed 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
2 
1 
5 
Appendix 8 (cont'd) 
Reference in text 
PRO l 
2 
V l 
2 
3 
4 
CJ 
R l-20 
Position held or category 
of interviewee 
Principal Research Officers 
at the Building Research 
Establishment 
Victims of burglary at 
their homes 
Circuit Judge 
Residents of Case Study 
Housing Estate 
lSL 
Number interviewed 
2 
4 
l 
20 
~~~-J 

